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AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADVANTAGES OF NON-MARKET 
BASED APPROACHES FOR DETERMINING CHAPTER 11 
CRAMDOWN RATES: A LEGAL AND FINANCIAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Thomas S. Green* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As litigation involving corporate matters became increasingly 
more technical in the twentieth century, principles of corporate fi-
nance began to play a major role in shaping many judicial opinions 
involving corporate, securities, and bankruptcy law.  The theoretical 
underpinnings of the bankruptcy laws and the federal securities laws 
have necessitated a certain degree of judicial deference towards expert 
witnesses with professional backgrounds in finance and accounting.  
Not surprisingly, bankruptcy courts in New York and Delaware fre-
quently hear legal issues relating to these developments as distressed 
businesses tend to exhibit fairly complex capital structures and large 
amounts of secured debt.  One of these issues is whether or not a court 
should defer to the credit markets in determining the appropriate rate 
of interest used to calculate deferred payments to secured lenders in a 
chapter 11 plan.  This Comment will discuss how and why, in making 
such a determination, the concept of market efficiency is crucial. 
In Till v. SCS Credit Corp., the Supreme Court of the United States 
addressed the issue of how a bankruptcy court should determine the 
interest rate used to discount deferred payments to secured lenders in 
a chapter 13 plan of debt readjustment.1  The plurality in Till held that 
the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) requires judges to 
 
* J.D., 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2009, University of Pennsylva-
nia.  Special thanks to Professor Stephen Lubben for his assistance with the topic se-
lection and comment drafting process.  Additional thanks to Fouad Kurdi and Richard 
Holm for their comments and feedback.  The following reflects the author’s views 
alone and does not represent the opinion of any law firm or other organization affili-
ated with the author. 
     1 Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2003) (holding that the formula approach 
must be used to determine the interest rate paid to secured lenders in a chapter 13 
plan of debt readjustment). 
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apply the “formula approach.”2  This method involves selecting a rele-
vant risk-free rate and adjusting upwards in accordance with the 
debtor’s risk of default in order to ensure that the present value of the 
future cash payments equals the allowed secured claim.3 
Since 2003, when the Till opinion was written, courts and com-
mentators have debated its applicability in chapter 11 cases,4 specifi-
cally with regard to Section 1129(b) of the Code.  The bankruptcy bar’s 
interest in this topic was reinvigorated in 2014 when Judge Robert 
Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District 
of New York issued a lengthy ruling heavily devoted to secured lender 
treatment in a chapter 11 cramdown.5  Interest rate determination was 
one of the primary contested matters when both the first and the 1.5 
lien noteholders6 asserted that Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the 
Code mandated a higher rate than the one offered under the plan.7  
More specifically, they advocated for the “coerced loan approach”: the 
rate that a creditor could obtain if he were to foreclose on the collat-
eral and reinvest the proceeds in a loan of comparable duration and 
risk to the one issued to the debtor under the plan.8  Notwithstanding 
the fact that the Supreme Court had already rejected the coerced loan 
approach in the chapter 13 context in Till, the indenture trustees as-
serted that Till’s holding did not apply to chapter 11 cases and that 
market rates should be used as proxies instead.9  The debtor (“Mo-
mentive”), on the other hand, arrived at the appropriate discount rate 
 
 2  Id. at 479–80.  
 3  Id. at 479. 
 4  See generally, e.g., Gary W. Marsh & Matthew W. Weiss, Chapter 11 Interest Rates 
After Till, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J.  209 (2010); Jason A. Pill, Untill the Footnote Was Written: 
The Effect of Till v. SCS Credit Corporation On 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2), 26 EMORY BANKR. 
DEV. J. 267 (2010); Mark J. Thompson & Katie M. McDonough, Lost in Translation: Till 
v. SCS Credit Corp. and the Mistaken Transfer of a Consumer Bankruptcy Repayment Formula 
to Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 893 (2015); Daniel R. Wong, 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Cramdowns: Adopting a Contract Rate Approach, 106 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1927 (2012).   
 5  In re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *1 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  In the text of this 
Comment, the author will hereinafter refer to In re MPM Silicones, LLC as “Momentive.”   
 6  After the senior secured creditor is paid in full, 1.5 lien noteholders are entitled 
to satisfaction of their claims with the remaining proceeds of the sale of collateral and 
may be issued in connection with an exchange offer.  See, e.g., Matthew DiLallo, Chesa-
peake Energy Corporation Considers Another Tactic to Address Looming Debt Maturities, THE 
MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 19, 2016, 12:30 PM) http://www.fool.com/ 
investing/general/2016/03/18/chesapeake-energy-corporation-considers-another-
ta.aspx.   
 7  In re MPM Silicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *71.   
 8  Id. at *71, 82. 
 9  Id.  
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by taking the seven-year treasury yield and adjusting this figure by a 
risk-premium associated with the restructured debtor.10  The debtor 
arrived at this figure using the formula approach, the very same 
method endorsed by the Till Court eleven years earlier.11  In confirm-
ing the plan, Judge Drain rejected the coerced loan approach as in-
consistent with the policy behind the Code.12  Notably, he held that Till 
is not only binding precedent in the chapter 13 context, but in the 
chapter 11 context as well.13 
The confirmation of Momentive’s cramdown plan elicited wide-
spread coverage and attention from the financial and legal press, dis-
tressed debt investors, and financial sponsors.14  Since incremental 
changes in the discount rate can amount to millions of dollars for se-
cured lenders in chapter 11 cases, this was far from unexpected.15  
Moreover, since the various financial institutions involved in the chap-
ter 11 process are frequently willing to devote a substantial number of 
resources to litigate matters such as these, the issue of cramdown rate 
determination in chapter 11 will likely be heard by a United States 
Court of Appeals16 in the near future.17  Accordingly, this Comment 
hopes to serve as a guide for bankruptcy and appellate courts alike 
 
 10  Id. at *70–71. 
 11  Id. 
 12  See id. at *73–74.  
 13  In re MPM Silicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *72–73.  
 14  See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Judge’s Ruling Could Affect Bondholders in Corporate 
Bankruptcies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2014, 3:49 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2014/08/28/judges-ruling-could-affect-bondholders-in-corporate-bankruptcies/; Na-
than Vardi, Leon Black’s Apollo Global Management Keeps Winning Battles And Outmaneu-
vering Creditors, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2014, 8:25 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
nathanvardi/2014/08/28/leon-blacks-apollo-global-management-keeps-winning-bat-
tles-and-outmaneuvering-creditors/#415a8101356d; Matt Wirz, Momentive Ruling 
Shakes Up Debt Markets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2014, 10:14 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
moneybeat/2014/08/28/momentive-ruling-shakes-up-debt-markets/.  This reaction 
was not surprising as Judge Drain made numerous determinations that could poten-
tially have a substantial impact on the rights of secured lenders in chapter 11 bank-
ruptcies; most significantly, the standard for determining whether an indenture enti-
tles a creditor to a “make-whole” call premium upon repayment of principal in 
bankruptcy. 
 15  For example, the outstanding principal on Momentive’s first and 1.5 lien re-
placement notes is approximately $1.3 billion. 
 16  This includes United States District Courts exercising appellate jurisdiction un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2012). 
 17  Indeed, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
affirmed Judge Drain’s opinion as this Comment was being written.  U.S. Bank N.A. v. 
Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y (In re MPM Silicones, LLC), 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  
The case is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit.   
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when they are confronted with the task of calculating the appropriate 
interest rate in a chapter 11 cramdown plan.  Unlike other commenta-
tors who have addressed this topic in the past, this Comment seeks to 
provide a unique perspective from both a legal and financial stand-
point.  As determined above, the latter is of grave importance because 
many courts have held that Till footnote 14 suggests that the coerced 
loan approach might be ideal in chapter 11 cases if parties can demon-
strate that the interest rates to be used as proxies are the product of an 
“efficient market.”18  Nonetheless, courts taking footnote 14’s directive 
have often applied standards that depart from the principles articu-
lated in the “Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis,”19 patently endorsed 
by the United States Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.20  This 
Comment will argue why these general principles should be relevant 
to the inquiry suggested by Till footnote 14.  Additionally, it will aug-
ment the Momentive court’s assertion that interest rates of exit facilities 
to companies emerging from chapter 11 and comparable debtors may 
not be efficient.  Although footnote 14 states that it might make sense 
to “ask what rate an efficient market [for loans to entities comparable 
to a debtor] would produce” in chapter 11, this Comment will discuss 
why this is a very difficult question to answer in practice and why such 
inquiry may be futile. 
Part II of this Comment will provide an overview of cramdown 
plans of reorganization under Section 1129(b) of the Code.  Part III 
will explain the concepts of discounting and present value, and it will 
examine why they are important with regard to secured creditor treat-
ment in chapter 11.  Part IV will analyze the Till decision in detail and 
discuss the post-Till case law on the requirements of Section 
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II), most notably Momentive and Bank of Montreal v. 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re American HomePatient, 
Inc.)21 by focusing on two aspects of the analysis: (1) whether the court 
chose to endorse the formula approach or a two-stepped coerced loan 
approach; and (2) the court’s policy justifications for doing so.  In cases 
where the court adopted the two-stepped coerced loan approach, Part 
 
 18  See infra Part V. 
 19  See infra Part V.  See also Pill, supra note 4, at 290 (“While the term ‘efficient 
market’ has a commonly used definition in securities litigation, the question remains 
whether bankruptcy courts will transpose the definition into the bankruptcy arena.”).  
 20  See, e.g., Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout Bank-
ruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap Solution, 2011 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 118, 157 n.124 (2011) (“In the parlance of economists, the Supreme Court 
has accepted the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis.” (citing Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988))).   
 21  420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 942 (2006). 
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IV will examine how the court conducted its market efficiency analysis.  
Part V will argue why Till should apply in chapter 11 cramdowns as a 
matter of judicial economy and public policy, specifically contending 
that the purpose of the cramdown rate is to ensure that the present 
value of a secured lender’s future cash flows equals the amount of its 
allowed secured claim and assert that this principle is no less relevant 
in the chapter 11 context. 
With this policy foundation established, the Comment will con-
sider corporate finance theory in discussing why the Efficient Capital 
Markets Hypothesis should be the proper standard for testing the effi-
ciency of market rates and explain why this theory might fail when ap-
plied to credit markets relevant to a typical chapter 11 proceeding.  It 
is important to note that Part V does not presume to determine con-
clusively the efficiency of modern credit markets.  Individuals with ad-
vanced degrees in finance and economics will surely publish new find-
ings in this ever-evolving field of study.  Rather, the purpose of Part V 
is to address the manner in which lawyers view the concept of market 
efficiency, reconcile how definition is applied in the securities context 
and the chapter 11 context, and address some of the reasons why mar-
ket interest rates may not be efficient.  Lastly, Part VI concludes. 
II. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 11 AND CRAMDOWN PLANS OF 
REORGANIZATION 
Chapter 11 of the Code was designed to “strike a balance between 
the need of a corporate debtor in financial hardship to be made eco-
nomically sound and the desire to preserve creditors’ and stockhold-
ers’ existing legal rights to the greatest extent possible.”22  In light of 
these competing policy concerns, distressed firms and their creditors 
have strong incentives to work with one another in devising a plan of 
restructuring and avoiding costly litigation whenever possible.23  Nev-
ertheless, obtaining unanimous consent for a plan that proposes to 
modify significantly the rights of numerous classes of creditors can be 
a daunting task.  Addressing this concern, the drafters of the Code 
granted bankrupt businesses an extraordinary remedy—the ability to 
implement a binding plan of restructuring on dissenting creditors and 
 
 22  See Wong, supra note 4, at 1931 (citing 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1100.01 (16th 
ed. 2014)). 
 23  See generally 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1100.01 (16th ed. 2014) (“The reorgani-
zation of a corporation is not a lawsuit in the ordinary sense of a procedure designed 
to settle issues between individual litigants, but a complex exercise of legal method, 
corporate finance and business management.”).   
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claimants alike.24 
The end goal for a “Debtor In Possession”25 is to obtain plan con-
firmation.26  A typical chapter 11 plan involves multiple changes to the 
firm’s current capital structure.  Debtors often modify the rights of se-
cured lenders by paying out the face value of their claims over an ex-
tended period of time.  General unsecured creditors may receive full 
or partial satisfaction of their claims27 through some combination of 
immediate consideration, deferred cash compensation, equity in the 
newly reorganized company, and warrants to purchase equity in the 
new company.  In some circumstances they may receive nothing at all.  
Equityholders of the old debtor more frequently end up with noth-
ing.28  The typical chapter 11 plan may also involve other significant 
changes to the company such as management changes, operational 
changes, the establishment of a litigation trust to fund the plan, and 
 
 24  See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)–(b) (2012).  Under the Trust Indenture Act 
(TIA), which governs the issuance of certain registered debt securities in the United 
States, all material changes to a bond’s indenture require unanimous consent of a 
company’s bondholders.  See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 
77ppp(b) (2012).  The Bankruptcy Code enables a bond issuer to circumvent the una-
nimity requirement of the TIA with respect to certain debt securities.  
 25  Under chapters 7 and 13 of the Code, a trustee is appointed to monitor and 
distribute the assets of the debtor and to represent the interests of general unsecured 
creditors.  Generally speaking, trustees are not appointed in chapter 11.  Rather, the 
debtor maintains operational control of its assets and becomes the “debtor in posses-
sion” (DIP).  A DIP is defined as a “debtor except when a person that has qualified 
under section 322 of this title is serving as a trustee in the case.”  11 U.S.C. § 1101(1).  
The DIP assumes all the rights and responsibilities of a trustee in bankruptcy and owes 
certain fiduciary duties to its creditors normally not owed outside of bankruptcy law.  
See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108.  
 26  In recent years, the use of “363 sales” has largely supplanted traditional chapter 
11 plans and has become a widespread form of corporate restructuring.  Broadly speak-
ing, a DIP can sell all or substantially all of its assets to a new buyer “free and clear of 
any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate.”  11 U.S.C. § 363(f).  
The buyer takes clean title to the assets, the business continues as a going concern 
under the control of the buyer, and the seller then distributes the cash proceeds to its 
creditors through a liquidating plan.  Although the Code’s drafters did not expressly 
codify this procedure, it remains the predominant form of “corporate reorganization” 
today.  While some scholars have supported 363 sales as a powerful tool that facilitates 
the continuation of a distressed business as a going concern, others have criticized 
their widespread use for numerous reasons beyond the scope of this paper.  See generally 
Stephen J. Lubben & Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Sales or Plans: A Comparative Account of the 
“New” Corporate Reorganization, 56 MCGILL L.J. 591 (2011).  But see Lynn M. LoPucki & 
Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 27  For example, if an unsecured bondholder is owed $1000 in principal, it is legally 
permissible under the Code to force such bondholder to accept consideration worth 
substantially less than that.  See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(1) (a plan may “impair or 
leave unimpaired any class of claims, secured or unsecured, or of interests”). 
 28  See id. 
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sales of various segments of the debtor-in-possession’s (DIP’s) busi-
ness.29 
For a consensual chapter 11 plan to be confirmed by a bankruptcy 
judge, it must meet the requirements of Section 1129(a) of the Code.30  
Confirmation is largely dependent upon approval by each class of cred-
itors.31  More specifically, a voting class of creditors is deemed to have 
accepted the plan if half of the class members and two-thirds of the 
dollar value of the class’ claims vote in favor of such plan.32 
Despite a debtor’s failure to obtain the necessary votes under Sec-
tion 1129(a)(8), it may nonetheless force the dissenting creditors to 
be bound by the plan’s terms.  This tactic is generally referred to as 
“cramdown.”33  In addition to meeting all of the requirements of Sec-
tion 1129(a), a cramdown plan must also satisfy the elements of Sec-
tion 1129(b).34  Broadly speaking, the two primary elements of Section 
1129(b) are the requirements that the plan (1) not “unfairly discrimi-
nate” between various classes of creditors and (2) be “fair and equita-
ble” with respect to each class of claimant.35  Section (2) of subsection 
(b) defines the phrase “fair and equitable” as it applies to each general 
type of claim—”secured claims,” “unsecured claims,” and “interests.”36 
Before discussing how Section 1129(b) defines “fair and equita-
ble” with respect to secured creditors, one must first examine how the 
Code defines a “secured claim.”  Section 506 states that a secured claim 
is one that is “secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an 
interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title.”37  A 
secured claim is secured “to the extent of the value of such creditor’s 
interest in the estate’s interest in such property.”38  More succinctly, a 
creditor whose claim is “secured by a lien on property in which the 
 
 29  See generally ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS 595–767 (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed. 2009) (discussing the chapter 11 plan 
negotiation and confirmation process). 
 30  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)–(16) lists the sixteen requirements a consensual plan 
must meet in order to be confirmed.  Among these is the requirement for a court to 
find that the confirmation of the plan will not likely be followed by another reorgani-
zation or liquidation.  § 1129(a)(11).  Additionally, all classes of impaired creditors 
must accept the plan.  § 1129(a)(8).  
 31  § 1129(a)(8).   
 32  § 1126(c). 
 33  See generally 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1129.03 (16th ed. 2014). 
 34  11 U.S.C. 1129(b) (2012).   
 35  § 1129(b)(1).  In Code parlance, the term “interests” in this context refers to 
equityholders of the old debtor.  
 36  § 1129(b)(2)(A)–(C). 
 37  11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(2012).  
 38  Id. 
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estate has an interest” is treated as a secured claimant if the value of 
the property exceeds the value of the claim.39  When the debt owed to 
such creditor exceeds the value of the collateral, however, the credi-
tor’s claim is bifurcated.40  Under this scenario, the lender will assert: 
(a) a secured claim in the amount of the value of the collateral itself; 
and (b) an unsecured claim, if recourse exists under state law, for the 
remaining portion of the debt.41  This process is also referred to as 
“cramdown” or “stripdown.”42 
An important exception to Section 506 exists in chapter 11.  Since 
a chapter 11 plan often calls for an arbitrary judicial valuation of a 
creditor’s collateral for purposes of determining the status of a secured 
claim, Congress enacted Section 1111(b) to protect creditors from 
such a valuation.43  Outside of bankruptcy, secured lenders provide fi-
nancing to a borrower with the expectation that they can look to the 
value of the collateral to satisfy their claims upon a default.  The satis-
faction of their claims comes from the cash proceeds of the sale of col-
lateral, and no judicial valuation is necessary.  When a debtor retains 
control over the collateral, however, a bankruptcy judge will hear ex-
pert witness testimony in order to calculate the estimated value of the 
collateral for purposes of determining what portion of a creditor’s 
claim is secured and what portion is unsecured.44  Because this process 
undermines a secured lender’s expectations under state law, Section 
1111(b) provides creditors with an alternative route.  With the 
“1111(b) election,” secured creditors have the option of waiving a de-
ficiency claim—even if recourse was never permitted by state law—and 
treating the entire balance as secured to protect against an unfavorable 
valuation.45 
 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. 
 42  For the remainder of this Comment, the term “cramdown” will refer to a chap-
ter 11 plan under Section 1129(b) of the Code.  The term “stripdown” will refer to the 
process of claims bifurcation under Section 506(a).  
 43  See 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1111.03[1] (16th ed. 2014) (“Congress took the 
position that disposition in a chapter 11 case of a creditor’s collateral was not like dis-
position in a liquidation case because of the opportunity in chapter 11 for a disposition 
based on judicial valuation.  Section 1111(b) thus attempts to balance the general dis-
taste and dissatisfaction with judicial valuations of property with the need to bring 
some reckoning to all debtor-creditor relations.  It does this by allowing secured cred-
itors, in most situations, to elect how their claim is treated. The consequences of that 
election are far-reaching.”).  
 44  See id. 
 45  11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2012).  Failure to make the “1111(b) election” provides 
secured lenders with the ability to participate in multiple voting classes.   
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With the proper definition of a secured claim established, the 
cramdown requirements of Section 1129(b) become easier to under-
stand.  In the cramdown setting in chapter 11, “fair and equitable” 
treatment of a secured claim includes the requirement that: 
“each holder of [a secured claim] receive on account of such 
claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount 
of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of 
at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s in-
terest in such property.”46 
This allowed amount will differ depending on whether the secured 
claimant proceeds under Section 506(a) or Section 1111(b), as will the 
amount of interest owed.47 
When a plan calls for an immediate lump-sum cash payment to a 
secured creditor, application of Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) is 
straightforward: the debtor-in-possession must pay the full value of the 
allowed secured claim if the cramdown plan is to be confirmed.  Often, 
however, a distressed business cannot afford to pay these claims in full 
on the effective date of a plan.  As a result, the secured lender is 
granted a note in lieu of a lump-sum payment.48  Section 
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) mandates that the noteholder receive additional 
compensation for these deferred payments.49  A note fails to meet the 
requirements of Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) if it “bears no interest 
or if it bears insufficient interest to discount the payment to the allowed 
amount of the claim.  In the language of the Code, the property thus 
given—the note—does not ‘have value, as of the effective date,’ of the 
allowed amount of the claim.”50  Despite universal agreement that the 
“time value of money” must be taken into consideration in any 
cramdown plan providing for deferred payments, courts remain di-
vided on the issue of how to determine the proper interest rate.  The 
Comment’s remainder will focus in detail on this topic. 
 
 
 
 46  § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (emphasis added).  
 47  Under Section 1111(b), the creditor’s recovery is capped at the nominal value 
of the claim.  See infra Part III. 
 48  See, e.g., U.S. Bank N.A. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y (In re MPM Silicones, 
LLC), 531 B.R. 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 49  7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1129.03 (16th ed. 2014) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 
1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II)(2012)) (emphasis added). 
 50  Id.  
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III. OVERVIEW OF DISCOUNTING AND THE PRESENT VALUE OF A NOTE 
In determining the “value” of a secured creditor’s note under a 
chapter 11 plan, a court must discount the cash flows generated by the 
note.51  Since the Code mandates that any deferred cash payments must 
equal the total value of the secured claim if it were paid in full today, a 
court must “translate all future cash flows into ‘today dollars.’  Only by 
making this adjustment can [a court] directly compare the amounts.”52 
When a secured creditor receives a note as part of a cramdown 
plan, the constant cash flows generated by such note can be referred 
to as an “annuity” in financial-speak.53  These payments have the effect 
of reducing the amount of principal owed by the debtor at the end of 
each period.54  In each subsequent period, a greater portion of the pay-
ment will offset the principal, a process known as “amortization.”55 
As stated in Part II, the present value of the cash flows generated 
by the note must equal the “allowed amount” of the secured lender’s 
claim.  In order to calculate the present value of the future payments, 
each payment is “discounted” back to “today dollars” based on when 
such payment is received.  The present value of the note is simply the 
sum of the present values of each payment generated by the note.  With 
the interest rate “r,” time period “t,” and the constant payment “C,” 
one can calculate this sum by applying the following formula: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51  See id. 
 52  STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, CORPORATE FINANCE 23 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 1st 
ed. 2014). 
 53  Id. at 29.   
 54  See id. 
 55  RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 44–45 (Michele Janicek et al. eds., 9th ed. 2008).  In the case of a 
replacement note granted to a secured lender in chapter 11, the principal is simply 
the allowed secured claim.  Id. 
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Figure 1: Present Value of an Annuity56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Because the Code mandates that the “PV” of the cash flows must 
equal the allowed secured claim, a constant, determining “C” and “r” 
is most relevant.  The equation can be rearranged to solve for this re-
quired annual payment to the secured creditor under the plan as a 
function of the discount rate “r”: 
 
Figure 2: Allowed Secured Claim Under Section 506 as an  
Annuity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Required Annual Payments to a Secured Creditor via a 
Note with Constant Payments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56  LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 29.  If the note calls for periodic interest payments, 
followed by payment of principal at the maturity date, the formula can be modified by 
adding a term that discounts the principal at maturity (most corporate bonds are struc-
tured this way).  The “yield,” “r,” represents the rate of return on the note while “C” is 
the nominal value of the coupon payments.  Any increase in the bond’s present value, 
or price, must be accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the yield.  Regardless 
of whether the replacement note is structured as an annuity or a bond, the allowed 
secured claim must equal the present value of the future cash flows generated by such 
instrument.  Id. at 66–67. 
PV = C
r
* 1- 1
1+ r  t






C = r * Secured Claim
1- 1
(1+ r)t




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This formula reveals that the each payment must equal the al-
lowed secured claim divided by the annuity formula from Figure 1 with 
constant payments of one dollar and discount rate “r.”  A more com-
plex mathematical analysis of this formula will show that an increase in 
the interest rate “r” will always lead to a lower present value of an an-
nuity.57  Since the required annual payment to the secured lender is 
equal to the allowed secured claim divided by the present value of an 
annuity with payments of one dollar, it follows that a decrease in the 
present value of the annuity results in a larger required payment to the 
secured creditor.  The formula above can be simplified by referring to 
“one over the present value of the annuity with constant payments of 
$1” as the “discount factor” given an interest rate “r” and “t” number 
of payments.  Based on the above, we see that C increases as the dis-
count factor increases. 
 
Figure 4: Simplified Formula 
C = Secured Claim x Discount Factor 
 
When a secured creditor chooses to make an 1111(b) election, 
the calculation entails an additional element.  In addition to receiving 
cash flows whose present value equals that of the collateral, a secured 
lender must also receive cash flows totaling the nominal value of the 
allowed claim.58  The formula changes accordingly:59 
 
Figure 5: Value of a Secured Lender’s Note Payments with 
1111(b) Election 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58  See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2012).  
 59  It is important to note that in a Section 1111(b) scenario, the lender’s allowed 
secured claim is not necessarily equal to the value of the underlying collateral. 
C = Max Collateral Value x Discount Factor, Secured Claim
t




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More frequently, corporate bonds are structured in a way that pro-
vides investors with semi-annual interest payments, or “coupons,” and 
repayment of principal at maturity.60  When these debt instruments are 
freely tradable on a secondary market, the actual rate of return can 
differ from the coupon.61  For example, a six percent note would entitle 
the holder to semi-annual coupon payments of thirty dollars.  The pre-
sent value formula is the same as in Figure 1; however, an additional 
term must be added to the equation to account for the present value 
of the $1000 principal at maturity. 
 
Figure 6: Bond Pricing Formula 
 
 
ܸܲሺܵܥሻ ൌ 	 ܥݎ 	 ∗ 	 ቈ1 െ
1
ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻݐ	቉
൅ 	 1,000ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻݐ 
 
 In an active secondary market, the purchase price a buyer is will-
ing to pay for the note is simply the present value of these payments.  
The interest rate, indicated by “r,” or the “yield,” is the discount rate 
that sets the present value of the coupons and principal equal to the 
price.  If a rational investor perceives the six percent bond to be less 
risky than its coupon warrants, it will pay a premium for the debt in-
strument.  Accordingly, the yield will fall below six percent.  Under this 
formula, price and yield are inversely related.  In the context of a chap-
ter 11 cramdown, if “C” is equal to “r,” the note will trade at 100% of 
the value of the secured claim.  If “C” exceeds “r,” the debt will trade 
at a premium. 
In corporate finance, calculating the appropriate yield is relatively 
straightforward: in order to ensure that the equation in Figure 1 bal-
ances out, note payments should be discounted at a rate that focuses 
on the likelihood of repayment.62  Aside from the firm-specific risk, 
some other factors to consider include duration, inflation, and the 
 
 60  LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 29 
 61  Id.  
 62  See generally LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 35–49. 
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value of any underlying collateral.63  An interest rate that properly in-
corporates these factors is more likely to provide an accurate valuation 
of the note itself.64  Arriving at the proper figure under the supervision 
of a bankruptcy court, however, remains a divisive issue.  Part IV will 
discuss how courts have addressed the competing approaches for de-
termining the proper rates within the chapter 13 and chapter 11 con-
texts. 
IV. TILL AND THE CASES THAT FOLLOW 
The seminal case addressing the competing methods for interest 
rate determination is Till v. SCS Credit Corp.65  Although this case deals 
with cramming down a secured lender in chapter 13 as opposed to 
chapter 11, the take-away from Part III is equally relevant in each in-
stance: secured lenders will always favor the approach that yields the 
highest “C.”  Moreover, chapter 13 is similar to chapter 11 in that it 
provides individuals and households with the ability to restructure 
their debts under the protection of the bankruptcy court.66  A typical 
chapter 13 plan consists of three or five years of constant payments to 
secured and unsecured creditors alike.67  Unlike in chapter 11, how-
ever, the requirements for plan confirmation are purely statutory, and 
no voting is necessary.68  If a debtor meets the requirements of Section 
1325 of the Code, a court will confirm his or her plan.69  The rights of 
secured creditors in chapter 13 are addressed in Section 
1325(a)(5)(B).  As in chapter 11, secured claims must be paid in full 
over the course of the plan.70  Also, like chapter 11, the statute “does 
not mention the term ‘discount rate’ or the world ‘interest.’”71  Still, 
the Supreme Court had previously held that, with regard to deferred 
payments to secured creditors, courts must “discount . . . [a] stream of 
deferred payments back to the[ir] present dollar value.”72  The only 
contested issue going into Till was the specific interest rate required to 
calculate these deferred payments.73 
 
 63  Id. 
 64  See id. 
 65  541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
 66  See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1330 (2012). 
 67  See § 1322(a)–(d). 
 68  § 1325(a). 
 69  Id. 
 70  § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).  
 71  Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 473 (2004). 
 72  Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 472 n.8 (1993). 
 73  Till, 541 U.S. at 473. 
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Since Till was decided, federal courts remain divided as to 
whether or not its holding applies in chapter 11.  Moreover, courts and 
commentators have noted that because the opinion was a plurality, its 
precedential value is debatable since it is unclear how exactly the Court 
would rule on this issue in the future.74  Nonetheless, because most 
courts have relied on this case to guide their calculation in the chapter 
11 context, Till is always a good starting point for any cramdown rate 
analysis. 
A. Till v. SCS Credit Corp.: SCOTUS Adopts the Formula Approach in 
Chapter 13 
In Till, the petitioners filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy protection 
in 1999.75  The petitioners’ chapter 13 plan provided that they would 
pay “interest on the secured portion of respondent’s claim at a rate of 
9.5% per year.”76  The respondent, an automobile lender with a pur-
chase money security interest in the debtors’ truck,77 contended that it 
was entitled to a rate of twenty-one percent because this was the rate 
“it would [have] obtain[ed] if it could [have] foreclose[d] on the ve-
hicle and reinvest[ed] the proceeds in loans of equivalent duration 
and risk as the loan” granted to petitioners—the coerced loan rate.78  
After a lengthy and convoluted appeals process, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine which approach should be used for 
calculating the discount rate on a secured lender’s deferred plan pay-
ments in chapter 13.79  The Court addressed four methods of interest 
rate determination. 
1. The Coerced Loan Approach 
The coerced loan approach, advocated by the secured lenders, 
looks to the market for loans to debtors of comparable risk.80  More 
specifically, courts would look at the interest rates “the creditor could 
have obtained if it had foreclosed on the loan, sold the collateral, and 
reinvested the proceeds in loans of equivalent duration and risk.”81 
 
 74  See, e.g., Wong, supra note 4, at 1944–45 (“The lack of a majority rationale weak-
ens the precedential effect of Till in non-Chapter 13 situations, especially because each 
opinion endorses a different method for determining interest rates.”). 
 75  Till, 541 U.S. at 470. 
 76  Id. at 471.  
 77  Commonly referred to as a “PMSI.” 
 78  Till, 541 U.S. at 471 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 79  Id. at 473.   
 80  Id. at 471.   
 81  Id. at 472.  
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Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens rejected this approach in 
Till because it is “complicated, imposes significant evidentiary costs, 
and aims to make each individual creditor whole rather than to ensure 
the debtor’s payments have the required present value.”82  The plurality 
also added that this method would require bankruptcy courts to con-
duct an inquiry far removed from their usual task of “evaluating debt-
ors’ financial circumstances and the feasibility of their debt adjustment 
plans.”83  Finally, Justice Stevens added that this approach would over-
compensate creditors as market interest rates include elements of 
profit, transaction costs, and other factors that are “no longer relevant 
in the context of court-administered and court-supervised cram down 
loans.”84 
2. The Presumptive Contract Rate Approach 
The presumptive contract rate approach is a “slightly modified 
version of the [coerced loan approach].”85  This method begins with 
the interest rate on a debtor’s initial loan.86  Recognizing, however, that 
loans to bankrupt debtors are inherently riskier than loans to non-
bankrupt individuals, courts applying the presumptive contract rate 
approach87 adjust the contract rate for the actual risks associated with 
the debtor.88 
The Supreme Court rejected the presumptive contract rate ap-
proach for the same reasons it rejected the coerced loan approach.89  
Additionally, it noted that rebutting the contract rate in order to move 
the discount rate downward would be extremely burdensome on debt-
ors seeking to “reduc[e] the likelihood that creditors will be substan-
tially overcompensated.”90  Finally, the Court emphasized the inconsist-
encies in creditor treatment that may result from this method91: 
“because the approach relies heavily on a creditor’s prior dealings with 
the debtor, similarly situated creditors may end up with vastly different 
 
 82  Id. at 477.  
 83  Id.  
 84  Till, 541 U.S. at 477. 
 85  Id. at 472. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Before Till made its way up to the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit adopted 
this approach and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court in order to come up 
with the appropriate adjustment to the contract rate of twenty-one percent.  Id. 
 88  Id. at 473. 
 89  Id. at 477. 
 90  Till, 541 U.S. at 477. 
 91  Id. at 478. 
GREEN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2016  1:34 PM 
2016] COMMENT 1167 
cram down rates.”92 
3. The Cost of Funds Approach 
This method of cramdown rate determination asks: “what it would 
cost the creditor to obtain the cash equivalent of the collateral from an 
alternative source.”93  The Supreme Court rejected this approach as it 
“mistakenly focuses on the creditworthiness of the creditor rather than 
the debtor” and increases the debtor’s overall evidentiary burden.94 
4. The Formula Approach 
The Court finally settled on the method advocated for by the debt-
ors—the formula approach.  The formula approach starts with the risk-
free rate and adjusts upward based on the risk of non-payment.95  The 
Court accepted this method for a number of reasons.96  First, by starting 
with a lower rate and adjusting upward, the burden lies “squarely 
[with] the creditors, who are likely to have readier access to any infor-
mation absent from the debtor’s filing.”97  Additionally, the evidentiary 
costs are minimal as the debtors’ bankruptcy papers, on record with 
the Court, contain a significant amount of information on the debtors’ 
post-confirmation credit risk.98  Unlike the previous three approaches, 
“the formula approach entails a straightforward, familiar, and objec-
tive inquiry, and minimizes the need for potentially costly additional 
evidentiary proceedings.”99  Finally, Justice Stevens added that the for-
mula approach “best comports with the purposes of the Bankruptcy 
Code” as it depends on “the state of financial markets, the circum-
stances of the bankruptcy estate, and the characteristics of the loan, 
not on the creditor’s circumstances or its prior interactions with the 
debtor.”100  The plurality further emphasized that the policy behind the 
cramdown rate is to “ensure that an objective economic analysis would sug-
gest the debtor’s interest payments will adequately compensate all such creditors 
for the time value of their money and the risk of default.”101  In fact, both the 
 
 92  Id.  
 93  Id. at 473 (quoting In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 94  Id. at 478.  
 95  Courts generally use the prime rate or treasury yield of comparable duration to 
a debtor’s loan.  See id. at 478–79. 
 96  Till, 541 U.S. at 479. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id.  
 100  Id. 
 101  Id. at 477 (emphasis added). 
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plurality and the dissent agreed with this initial premise;102 their only 
disagreement was over “which procedure will more often produce ac-
curate estimates of the appropriate interest rate.”103 
B. Post-Till Cases Dealing with Cramdown Interest Rate Determination 
in the Chapter 11 Context 
Since Till was decided, federal courts remain divided with regard 
to its applicability in chapter 11.  The cases that follow serve to illustrate 
the competing approaches of bankruptcy courts around the country. 
1. Momentive 
In 2006, MPM Silicones (“Momentive”) was taken private through 
a leveraged buyout (LBO) by prominent financial sponsor Apollo 
Global Management (“Apollo”).104  In order to finance the transaction, 
Apollo saddled Momentive with a substantial amount of debt.105  In 
2012, Momentive issued first and 1.5 lien notes pursuant to an inden-
ture that provided for 8.875% and 10% interest rates respectively (col-
lectively, the “Senior Lien Notes”).106  As is often the case with LBOs, 
the target company failed in part due to its highly leveraged capital 
structure.107  In April 2014, Momentive filed for bankruptcy and pro-
posed a plan that would eliminate more than three billion dollars in 
debt.108  Momentive’s plan was structured with a “death trap” provision: 
it proposed that “all outstanding principal and accrued interest on the 
Senior Lien Notes would be paid in cash to the Senior Lien Notes on 
the effective date of the Plan.”109  This payment would not, however, 
provide for any sort of “make-whole” premium to the Senior Lien Note-
holders.110  If the Senior Lien Noteholders refused the terms of the 
 
 102  Till, 541 U.S. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 103  Id. 
 104 Sara Randazzo, Judge Approves Momentive’s Bankruptcy Exit Plan (Sept. 12, 2014, 
3:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/judge-approves-momentive-bankruptcy-
exit-plan-1410548507. 
 105  Id.  
 106  U.S. Bank. N.A. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y (In re MPM Silicones, LLC), 531 
B.R. 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 107  Randazzo, supra note 104.  
 108  Id.  
 109  In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 531 B.R. at 326. 
 110  Id.  When a creditor refinances its debt on the open market, the “make-whole” 
call premium is designed to compensate the noteholder for the foregone coupon pay-
ments it would have received between the call date and maturity date.  See LUBBEN, 
supra note 52, at 197.  Whether or not payment in bankruptcy triggers the make-whole 
is an issue of contract interpretation.  
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consensual plan, Momentive proposed to cram them down with re-
placement notes “with a present value equal to the Allowed amount of any 
such holder’s Claim.”111  Because Momentive failed to meet the voting 
requirements of Section 1129(a)(8), the plan had to proceed under 
Section 1129(b).112 
Interest rate determination was one of the many contested issues 
at Momentive’s confirmation hearing.113  Momentive’s Senior Lien 
Noteholders objected on the grounds that their deferred payments un-
der the plan failed to meet the requirements of Section 
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).114  More specifically, they alleged that they were en-
titled to a higher discount rate than the one proposed under the 
plan—seven-year treasury plus 1.5%, or approximately 3.6%.115  Like 
the lenders in Till, the Senior Lien Noteholders asserted that the co-
erced loan approach—not the formula approach used by the debt-
ors—was best-suited.116  They argued that Till is only binding in chapter 
13 cases and thus was not relevant for Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) con-
siderations.  In holding that Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) mandates the 
use of the formula approach, Judge Drain began by noting that “there 
is no sufficiently contrary basis to distinguish the chapter 13 and chap-
ter 11 plan contexts in light of the similarity of the language of the two 
provisions and the underlying present value concept that Till recog-
nized should be applied uniformly throughout the Code.”117  Stating 
that the same policy concerns that had led the Supreme Court to ac-
cept the formula approach in Till are equally relevant in chapter 11, 
the court concluded that the indenture trustee had provided no basis 
for its claim that it must be put in “in the same position that it would 
have been in had it arranged a ‘new’ loan.”118  The court affirmed Jus-
tice Stevens’ rationale in Till that the cramdown rate analysis should 
not take into account factors such as “transaction costs and overall 
profits.”119  Rather, the purpose of Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) is simply 
to ensure that the present value of the deferred cash payments (“C”) 
 
 111  In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 531 B.R. at 326 (emphasis added). 
 112  Id. 
 113  In re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *70 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014). 
 114  Id.  Notably, Judge Drain also determined that the language of the first and 1.5 
lien indentures did not entitle the noteholders to the make-whole premium.  See gen-
erally Lubben, supra note 14. 
 115  In re MPM Silicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *70–71.   
 116  Id. at *71.   
 117  Id. at *72–73.  
 118  Id. at *75. 
 119  Id. (quoting Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477–78 (2004)).  
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is equal to that of the allowed secured claim.120 
Notwithstanding the policy concerns addressed above, the se-
cured lenders in Momentive put forth an additional argument based on 
a footnote from Till.121  In footnote 14, Justice Stevens suggested that a 
coerced loan approach might work in chapter 11 if a bankruptcy court 
can determine that an efficient market exists for such loans.  Footnote 
14 states: 
Because every cram down loan [in chapter 13] is imposed by 
a court over the objection of the secured creditor, there is no 
free market of willing cram down lenders.  Interestingly, the 
same is not true in the Chapter 11 context, as numerous lend-
ers advertise financing for Chapter 11 debtors in posses-
sion.122 
Justice Stevens went on to note that in chapter 11, “it might make 
sense to ask what rate an efficient market would produce.”123  The se-
cured lenders in Momentive argued that footnote 14 required a coerced 
loan approach in chapter 11 on the ground that the interest rates 
charged by the debtor’s bridge lenders and exit facility financiers were 
efficient.124  They argued that these rates should be used as proxies for 
the plan payments.125  Had the Senior Lien Noteholders accepted the 
terms of the original plan, their notes would have been refinanced via 
exit facilities that provided for a five percent interest rate for the first 
lien exit lenders and a seven percent interest rate for the 1.5 lien lend-
ers.126  Accordingly, they proposed that these rates should be used in-
stead of the 3.6% and 4.1% rates offered under the plan.127 
Rejecting the creditors’ argument, the court in Momentive pointed 
out a significant flaw in footnote 14.  The court emphasized that Justice 
Stevens was referring to DIP financing and not exit financing when he 
stated that numerous lenders advertise to chapter 11 debtors in posses-
sion.128  DIP financing occurs at the beginning of a case, and lenders 
obtain special priority status under a plan.129  Exit financing, on the 
other hand, occurs at confirmation.130  Because chapter 11 plans often 
 
 120  Id. 
 121 In re MPM Silicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *78. 
 122  Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14.  
 123  Id.  
 124  See In re MPM Silicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *74–79. 
 125  Id. at *74. 
 126  Id. at *87. 
 127  Id. at *74. 
 128  Id. at *81. 
 129  Id.  
 130  See In re MPM Silicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *81. 
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shave substantial amounts of debt from the books of a debtor, creditors 
at confirmation are presented “with a less risky, more stable and re-
structured debtor.”131  This partially eliminates the need to compensate 
the creditor with the higher yields that DIP loans provide.  With this in 
mind, the court emphasized that the market for exit financing in chap-
ter 11 is not a robust one and that the claim that such a market is effi-
cient is dubious at best.132  As a result, the court held that the Senior 
Lien Noteholders were not entitled to the rates offered by the exit 
lenders.  “In this case, for example, the evidence shows that there were 
only three available exit lenders to the debtors, who eventually com-
bined on proposed backup takeout facilities while seeking to keep con-
fidential their fees and rate flex provisions.”133  The court ultimately 
concluded that footnote 14 should be read narrowly as not to restrict 
Till’s applicability to chapter 11 bankruptcies and set the replacement 
notes’ interest rates at 4.1% and 4.85%.134  Many other courts across 
the country have reached this same conclusion.135 
2. Till’s Footnote 14 and the Two-Stepped Approach 
Other federal courts have held that a market-based approach may 
be used to determinate the rate of interest on a cramdown loan in 
chapter 11 if a trial court can determine that an efficient market for 
comparable loans exists.  In American HomePatient, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit endorsed a two-step approach 
for determining the discount rate in a chapter 11 cramdown.136  Relying 
primarily on footnote 14, the Sixth Circuit determined that bankruptcy 
courts should first look to the market for loans to businesses financially 
comparable to the DIP.137  If the lender can demonstrate that the mar-
ket is efficient, these rates should be used as proxies for plan pay-
ments.138  Otherwise, courts should apply the formula approach.139  
Apart from American HomePatient, other courts have adopted this two-
 
 131  Id.  
 132  See id. at *82. 
 133  Id. at *83.  
 134  Id. at *98–99. 
 135  See id. at *89 (citing In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 460 B.R. 38 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2011); In re Marfin Ready Mix Corp., 220 B.R. 148, 158 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
1998); In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I L.P., 454 B.R. 702, 712–13 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011); 
In re Lilo Props., LLC, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4407, at *3–6 (Bankr. D. Vt. Nov. 4, 2011)). 
 136  Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. HomePa-
tient, Inc.), 420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 942 (2006). 
 137  Id.  
 138  Id.  
 139  Id.  
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part test as well.140  These courts seem to emphasize one common 
theme: as to chapter 11, Till is instructive but not binding.141  As the 
court in American HomePatient noted: 
[The Sixth Circuit] decline[s] to blindly adopt Till’s endorse-
ment of the formula approach [in Chapter 11] . . . . Rather, 
we opt to take our cue from Footnote 14 of the opinion, 
which offer[s] the guiding principle that “when picking a 
cram down rate in a Chapter 11 case, it might make sense to 
ask what rate an efficient market would produce.”142 
In spite of the guidance of Till footnote 14 and American HomePa-
tient, the standard for determining whether a market for loans is effi-
cient remains highly ambiguous.  In fact, often times, courts adopting 
the two-stepped methodology of American HomePatient end up using 
the formula approach when the parties fail to present any sort of effi-
cient markets evidence altogether.143  Nonetheless, there are a few re-
ported decisions describing how courts address the question of market 
efficiency. 
3. Current Market Efficiency Standards for Cramdown Rate 
Determination 
One example of an opinion explaining how an efficient market 
analysis should work is In re 20 Bayard Views, LLC.144  In Bayard Views, 
the debtor, a condominium developer, proposed a cramdown plan 
over the objection of W Financial Fund LP (WFF), the debtor’s pri-
mary secured lender.145  The court decided to follow the two-step ap-
proach for rate determination endorsed in American HomePatient.146  
 
 140  See In re MPM Sillicones, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *74 (citing Mercury Capital 
Corp. v. Milford Conn. Assocs., L.P., 354 B.R. 1, 11–12 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006); In re 
Cantwell, 336 B.R. 688, 692–93 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006); In re 20 Bayard Views LLC, 445 
B.R. 83 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011)).   
 141  In re Am. HomePatient, Inc., 420 F.3d at 568.   
 142  Id. (citing Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 476 n.14 (2004)).  
 143  See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Tex. Grand. Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C. (In re 
Tex. Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C.), 710 F.3d 324, 333 (5th Cir. 2013) (“While 
courts often acknowledge that Till’s Footnote 14 appears to endorse a ‘market rate’ 
approach under Chapter 11 if an ‘efficient market’ for a loan substantially identical to 
the cramdown loan exists, courts almost invariably conclude that such markets are ab-
sent.”) (emphasis added); In re Cantwell, 336 B.R. 688, 693 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006) 
(“Here, there has been no evidence produced to establish that an ‘efficient market’ 
exists to refinance the mortgages on the debtors’ property immediately, as the debtors 
are emerging from their Chapter 11 case.  We therefore [apply the formula ap-
proach].”).   
 144  445 B.R. 83 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 145  Id. at 88.  
 146  Id. at 109. 
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Advocating for a coerced loan rate,147 WFF presented expert testimony 
on the existence of a loan market for similar condominium develop-
ers.148  The court determined that the analysis should begin with an 
inquiry into whether other creditors are willing to lend to companies 
similar to the debtor.149  Such a market is deemed “efficient” if these 
creditors are willing to lend on terms similar to those of the replace-
ment notes under the plan.150  The court noted that some other courts 
examine “whether the debtor can obtain a loan through a combination 
of different tranches of financing.”151 
At trial, the debtor presented evidence indicating that local lend-
ers had no interest in issuing loans to similar real estate developers.152  
The creditors put forth evidence demonstrating that local lenders 
would be willing to finance companies similar to the debtor-in-posses-
sion via a three-tiered capital structure consisting of first lien debt, mez-
zanine financing, and equity.153  WFF’s expert witness testified that the 
average cost of capital associated with this financing structure 
amounted to approximately 11.68%—a figure greater than the dis-
count rate proposed under the plan.154 
The court ultimately concluded that “an efficient market does not 
exist for a loan of this size secured by collateral of this nature in the 
full amount of the value of the [p]roperty,” and “participants in the 
loan market were not willing to make a loan of the nature proposed in 
the [p]lan.”155  The court ironically relied on WFF’s expert’s own ad-
mission that no creditors would be willing to lend on a 100% loan-to-
value basis as the relevant condominium financing market perceives 
 
 147  Id. at 106 (“SCS objected to confirmation of the plan, arguing that 21 percent 
was the appropriate interest rate because that was the rate it would have received if it 
had foreclosed on the truck and reinvested the proceeds in loans of similar duration 
and risk.”). 
 148  Id. at 110. 
 149  Id. at 109. 
 150  See In re 20 Bayard Views, 445 B.R. at 109 (citing In re One Times Square Assocs. 
Ltd. P’ship, 159 B.R. 695, 706 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)). 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. at 110.  The debtor’s third amended plan of reorganization (“the plan”) 
called for WFF to retain the liens on its secured claim of approximately eighteen mil-
lion dollars as well as to receive new liens on any “leases related to the condominium 
storage units.”  Id. at 91.  Additionally, the debtor proposed to make 4.5% monthly 
interest payments on the face value of WFF’s claim in addition to accelerating annual 
principal payments over a five-year period.  Id. at 88. 
 153  Id. at 110. 
 154  Id. 
 155  Id.  
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the risk associated with such leverage to be too high.156  Since the cred-
itor failed to meet its burden in establishing an “efficient market,” the 
court next applied the formula approach and determined that the 
1.5% risk premium did not adequately reflect the likelihood of a de-
clining equity cushion in the collateral and the possibility of the plan’s 
failing.157 
Although Bayard Views failed to ultimately apply the coerced loan 
approach, it demonstrates, in detail, the factors that courts consider 
when determining whether a market for coerced lines is “efficient.”  
Other courts and commentators have considered slightly modified ap-
proaches.158  Part V.B. will analyze whether this type of analysis truly 
comports with the policy behind Till and footnote 14 and will discuss 
why this method is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s definition of 
“market efficiency.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 156  In re 20 Bayard Views, 445 B.R. at 111. 
 157  Id. at 113. 
 158  See, e.g., In re Winn-Dixie Stores, 356 B.R. 239, 56 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) 
(“Debtor’s search resulted in fourteen proposals among competing lending institu-
tions for a loan that would be junior to the Class 10 Claimants’ liens.  The result of 
that search was an interest rate of LIBOR plus 150 points.  The Court finds that the 
process leading to the exit facility was an efficient test of the market.”); In re S. Canaan 
Cellular Invs., 427 B.R. 44, 78 n.21 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010) (“Determination of whether 
that market exists requires evidence of loans similar in time of repayment, amount to 
be repaid, quality of collateral, and risk of repayment owing to the financial condition 
of the borrower.”); Gen. Elec. Credit Equities, Inc. v. Brice Rd. Devs., L.L.C. (In re 
Brice Rd. Devs., L.L.C.), 392 B.R. 274, 280–81 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2008) (noting that in 
determining whether a comparable loan market is efficient, courts may consider “the 
priority of the lien securing the loan; whether there exists an open, well-developed 
market for loans of the kind between the debtor and secured creditor; the type of 
collateral involved; the quality, age, and life expectancy of the collateral; the proposed 
short- or long- term nature of the loan; and the amount financed”); Louis E. Ro-
bichaux IV et al., Till in Chapter 11 Cases and the Looming “Efficient Market” Debate, AM. 
BANKR. INST., July 2013, at 22, 24 (proposing that in conducting an efficient markets 
analysis, expert witnesses consider the general macroeconomic environment, capital 
markets metrics, the debtor’s industry, and “current underwriting parameters in the 
loan market that sufficiently matches the cramdown loan,” such as  “prevailing interest 
rates, lien priority, loan-to-value ratio, and debt service coverage or debt-to-EBITDA 
ratio”).  
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V. WHY THE FORMULA APPROACH SHOULD BE USED IN CHAPTER 11: 
TILL AND THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS HYPOTHESIS BOTH 
NECESSITATE SUCH A RESULT 
The holding in American HomePatient subjects itself to criticism for 
a number of reasons.  First, as articulated in Momentive, any attempt to 
justify the use of a coerced rate approach in chapter 11 is inconsistent 
with the overriding policy concerns of the Code outlined in Till.  Sec-
ond, the type of efficient market analysis contemplated by courts that 
declined to follow Till is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s notion 
of market efficiency as it erroneously equates the concept of a robust 
market with an efficient market.159  The parts of this Comment that 
follow discuss why all of these concerns provide support for the use of 
Till’s formula approach in chapter 11. 
A. Till’s Applicability in Chapter 11: Cost-Savings and Public Policy 
Justifications 
Economic considerations, stare decisis, and public policy all 
strongly favor Till’s application to all chapters of the Code.  Such con-
siderations should encourage courts to apply a non-market-based ap-
proach in chapter 11. 
One important consideration for interpreting the Bankruptcy 
Code is how a particular reading of the language of the statute will 
impact the economics of the estate and the courts.  Unanticipated post-
petition fees and expenses can be detrimental to the debtor’s business.  
The evidentiary costs of a hearing on the efficiency of the market for 
comparable loans create another obstacle for a DIP attempting to get 
a plan confirmed.  More financial resources are drained, and the like-
lihood of the debtor’s emergence from bankruptcy decreases.  The Su-
preme Court emphasized the importance of minimizing these costs in 
rejecting the coerced loan and cost of funds approach.  “[T]he cost of 
funds approach imposes a significant evidentiary burden, as a debtor seeking 
to rebut a creditor’s asserted cost of borrowing must introduce expert testimony 
about the creditor’s financial condition.”160  As stated by the Momentive 
court, these policy concerns are equally relevant in chapter 11.  Prof-
fering expert testimony is a costly and time-consuming process that 
may ultimately serve as a detriment to successful business reorganiza-
tion.  Indeed one commentator has emphasized how problematic this 
 
 159  See, e.g., Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 20, at 157 (“The Supreme Court has 
long embraced the belief, widely shared by many Anglo-American economists, that 
well-regulated financial markets effectively process available information and thereby 
fairly and appropriately value securities.”).  
 160  Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 478 (2004) (emphasis added).   
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burden can be, noting that “[a]s the credit crisis worsens and DIP lend-
ing becomes scarce, it will become increasingly problematic to require 
chapter 11 debtors to adduce evidence of a market rate, let alone an 
efficient market rate during a recession.”161  The incremental eviden-
tiary costs associated with the formula approach, however, are minimal 
as the bankruptcy court already has the necessary information at hand 
for determining the applicable risk premium.162  Bankruptcy courts 
routinely examine the factors used to arrive at such a premium when 
determining the feasibility of a plan under Section 1129(a)(11).163  
Some of these factors may include “[the] debtor’s industry, projec-
tions, leverage, revised capital structure, and obligations under the 
plan.”164  Because these factors are always taken into consideration in 
any Section 1129(a)(11) analysis, the formula approach will save the 
court both time and resources.  The formula approach therefore re-
duces the overall burdens associated with chapter 11, both from debtor 
and judicial perspectives, and increases the likelihood of the debtor’s 
successful emergence from bankruptcy. 
The doctrine of stare decisis is also particularly relevant in corpo-
rate restructuring jurisprudence.  Consistent legal standards play an 
important role in determining the likelihood that a distressed business 
will emerge from bankruptcy.165  As the “interests of predictability in 
commercial bankruptcy cases are of such great importance,”166 courts 
should adopt a cramdown rate approach that yields consistent and pre-
dictable results.  The range of potential outcomes from the coerced 
loan approach is vast and imposes a significant level of uncertainty on 
 
 161  Pill, supra note 4, at 298–99. 
 162  Till, 541 U.S. at 479 (stating that the court must start with the appropriate risk-
fee rate and “adjust the [rate] accordingly” based on factors such as “the circumstances 
of the estate, the nature of the security, and the duration and feasibility of the reor-
ganization plan”).  
 163  See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012) (“Confirmation of the plan is not likely to 
be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the 
debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reor-
ganization is proposed in the plan.”).  Commonly known as the “feasibility test,” a 
debtor satisfies this test through expert testimony on the company’s operations, finan-
cial statements and projections, general economic conditions and systemic risk, and 
proffers demonstrating the risk associated with plan confirmation. 
 164  See generally AM. BANKR. INST. COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, 
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 234–37 (2012), http://commission.abi.org/ 
full-report. 
 165  See In re GMC, 407 B.R. 463, 504 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[S]tare decisis is par-
ticularly important in commercial bankruptcy cases because of the expense and 
trauma of any commercial bankruptcy, and the need to deal with foreseeable events, 
by pre-bankruptcy planning, to the extent they can be addressed.”).  
 166  Id. 
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the debtor.  The magnitude of this variation can amount to millions of 
extra dollars in unanticipated interest payments.167  The risk premium 
associated with the formula approach, however, tends to be lower and 
more stable since a bankruptcy judge cannot confirm a plan unless it 
“is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further 
financial reorganization” unless disclosed.168  Such a conclusion inher-
ently necessitates a relatively low and predictable risk-premium under 
the formula approach.  By using the formula approach, courts can 
therefore eliminate some of the uncertainty associated with the wide 
range of possible outcomes under the coerced loan approach. 
Public policy considerations also play a significant role when ana-
lyzing any statute.  The policy argument against applying the formula 
approach appears to be predicated upon two themes: (1) the desire to 
protect a creditor’s pre-petition expectations; and (2) the inherent dif-
ferences between a consumer debtor and a business debtor.169  The for-
mer stems from the concern that the cramdown rate might be signifi-
cantly smaller than the original contract rate and will therefore 
undermine the lender’s initial expectations.  The probability of a bank-
ruptcy filing, however, is generally contemplated when executing a 
credit agreement.  A “default” under the agreement is often defined 
to include a bankruptcy filing, and the debt immediately accelerates.  
When this occurs, there is often a significant time delay between the 
filing and the distributions under the plan.  Moreover, in the case of a 
sale of the debtor’s assets, such sale may yield insufficient proceeds to 
cover the lender’s claim, and the creditor is forced to take a substantial 
loss.  In sum, a bankruptcy petition inherently triggers numerous un-
certainties, and the Code expressly contemplates multiple scenarios 
where a creditor’s expectations may be undermined.  With respect to 
the second concern, while it is true that the policies underlying a con-
sumer bankruptcy and business reorganization differ in many respects, 
Congress explicitly codified numerous provisions that reflect these 
concerns.  That Congress chose to use virtually identical language in 
the relevant chapter 11 and chapter 13 provisions suggests that it did 
not intend for the cramdown rate analysis to differ in the two contexts.  
“[T]here is no sufficiently contrary basis to distinguish the chapter 13 
and chapter 11 plan contexts in light of the similarity of the language of 
the two provisions and the underlying present value concept that Till recognized 
 
 167  See generally GMAC v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 1997) (not-
ing the wide range of risk-premiums applied by courts in the consumer cramdown 
settings). 
 168  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).  
 169  See, e.g., Wong, supra note 4, at 1954–56. 
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should be applied uniformly throughout the Code.”170  Major American finan-
cial institutions may contain both consumer and corporate financing 
arms, and it makes little sense to suggest that businesses loans and cor-
porate loans should be treated differently in this context. 
The strength of the policy justifications behind applying the for-
mula approach and the flaws of the arguments against its applicability 
in chapter 11 combine to favor a broad reading of Till that incorpo-
rates its holding to chapter 11.  These policy considerations should de-
ter courts confronted with chapter 11 cramdown plans from reading 
Till footnote 14 in “a way contrary to Till and Valenti’s first princi-
ples.”171  The principles articulated in these cases are straightforward 
and equally applicable in chapter 13 and chapter 11: the proper inter-
est rate should set the present value of a note’s future cash flows equal 
to the amount of the allowed secured claim when discounted by the 
correct yield.  Although Till is often discounted because it is a plurality 
opinion, even the dissenting four Justices concurred with this funda-
mental principle.172  As discussed in Part III, factors such as the firm’s 
risk of nonpayment, the duration of the note, inflation, and the value 
of the collateral will yield a rate that will balance the equation in Figure 
6.  For the aforementioned reasons, a non-market-based approach is a 
more efficient method of achieving this objective from a policy per-
spective. 
The above notwithstanding, it should be noted that the American 
Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) Commission to Study the Reform of Chap-
ter 11 (the “Commission”) recently suggested that Congress should re-
ject Till’s applicability to chapter 11 cases.173  In fact, the Commission 
went a step further than the Sixth Circuit in American HomePatient in 
arguing that the formula approach is inappropriate in chapter 11 
“even if an efficient market does not exist.”174  Nonetheless, the Com-
 
 170  In re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *72–
73 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014) (emphasis added).  
 171  Id. at *84.  
 172  Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 508 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Eight 
justices are in agreement that the rate of interest set forth in the debtor’s approved 
plan must include a premium for risk.  Of those eight, four are of the view that begin-
ning with the contract rate would most accurately reflect the actual risk, and four are 
of the view that beginning with the prime lending rate would do so.”); see also In re 
Texas Grand Prairie Hotel, 710 F.3d 324, 330 (5th Cir. 2013) (“In other words, the 
deferred payments, discounted to present value by applying the appropriate interest 
rate . . . must equal the allowed amount of the secured creditor’s claim.”). 
 173  AM. BANK. INS. COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 164, at 
234–37.   
 174  Id. at 237.  
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mission did not address in detail why the overarching policy goals de-
scribed in Till should apply only in chapter 13.175  Furthermore, the 
Commission asserted that the formula approach fails to capture the 
economic realities of the restructured debtor.176  It is unclear, however, 
why the Commission takes this position when the formula approach, 
by its very definition, attempts to capture the underlying variables as-
sociated with the firm’s credit risk.  Additionally, the Commission 
states that if a market rate cannot be determined, courts should con-
sider a “risk-adjusted rate that reflects the actual risk posed in the case 
of the reorganized debtor considering factors such as the debtor’s in-
dustry, projections, leverage, revised capital structure, and obligations 
under the plan.”177  These are some of the factors that should be inher-
ent in any interest rate calculation.178 
Further, the Commission’s argument that the formula rate likely 
undercompensates the creditor for the risk associated with the post-
confirmation debtor may suggest that the debtor should not have even 
passed the feasibility test in the first place.  Since Section 1129(a)(11) 
requires courts to determine that confirmation of the plan is not “likely 
to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial re-
organization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the 
plan,” such a determination may be tantamount to a finding that the 
securities issued under the plan do not carry enough risk to warrant a 
substantial premium over the treasury or prime rate.179  Additionally, 
the Commission acknowledges that it did not try to decipher the hold-
ing in Till.180  Nonetheless, because the Till case is the closest indicator 
of where the Supreme Court may stand on this issue, it makes sense to 
scrutinize footnote 14, at least before Congress formally considers the 
Commission’s proposals. 
 
 175  Id. 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id.  
 178  See, e.g., In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel, 710 F.3d 324, 334 (5th Cir. 2013) (not-
ing that the risk premium should factor in “the quality of the debtor’s management, 
the commitment of the debtor’s owners, the health and future prospects of the 
debtor’s business, the quality of the lenders collateral, and the feasibility and duration 
of the plan”). 
 179  See In re MPM Silicones, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *81 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014) (“The fact that the debtor is more stable is bound up 
in the court’s necessary feasibility determination under Section 1129(a)(11).”).  See 
also Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 480–81 (“If the court determines that the 
likelihood of default is so high as to necessitate an ‘eye-popping’ interest rate . . . the 
[chapter 13] plan probably should not be confirmed.”) (citations omitted).   
 180  AM. BANKR. INST. COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 164, 
at 234–37.   
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B. Financial Considerations: Reconciling the Different Standards for 
Determining Market Efficiency and the Potential Pitfalls of the 
Footnote 14 Analysis 
In spite of the compelling public policy reasons for using the for-
mula approach discussed above, many courts have rejected this line of 
reasoning.  Courts that have done so often base their decisions upon 
Till footnote 14.  As the wording of this footnote is highly convoluted 
and contains numerous technical ambiguities, an examination of what 
the Supreme Court might have intended is crucial before taking foot-
note 14’s directive. 
At first glance, footnote 14 appears to suggest that DIP loans 
might serve as accurate proxies for cramdown rates.  For the reasons 
stated above, however, most bankruptcy practitioners acknowledge 
that this was a technical error on Justice Stevens’ part.  As a result, 
courts that disapprove of the per se use of the formula approach in 
chapter 11 have modified the analysis to find that footnote 14 allows 
parties to “ask what [non-DIP loan] rate an efficient market would pro-
duce”181 before determining whether the formula approach or coerced 
loan approach should be used in a chapter 11 case.  But what exactly 
does Justice Stevens mean by “efficient market?”  As discussed supra, 
courts have interpreted footnote 14 in a way that allows creditors to 
receive a coerced loan rate if they can show that a robust market exists 
for loans to entities similar to the debtor (what these courts call an 
“efficient market”).182  Indeed, this was the test that American HomePa-
tient and 20 Bayard Views endorsed.183  When carefully scrutinizing this 
footnote, however, reasonable minds can differ as to whether an abun-
dance of lenders is the sole criterion for what the Supreme Court 
deems an “efficient market.”184  After all, if Justice Stevens had truly 
believed that the existence of an abundance of lenders to similar debt-
ors was the only factor in ascertaining the reliability of market rates, 
why did he not accept the creditor’s argument in Till?  The secured 
lender in that case was able to demonstrate the existence of a robust 
 
 181  Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14. 
 182  See supra Part IV.B.3.  
 183  Id. 
 184  See, e.g., A Deep Dive into Till v. SCS Credit Corp—Part VII: How to Understand 
Footnote 14, THE NECESSARY AND PROPER BLOG, (Jan. 3, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://thenec-
essaryandproperblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/a-deep-dive-into-till-v-scs-credit-
corp_2837.html (arguing that courts have misinterpreted the meaning of footnote 14 
and have overemphasized its precedential value in chapter 11); Pill, supra note 4, at 
291–92 (“In Till, the Court referenced in dicta a ‘free market of willing lenders’ but 
did not establish whether the availability of DIP lending singularly would establish the 
presence of a  market.”).  
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primary market for subprime automobile lending (as noted by Judge 
Drain in Momentive).  Nonetheless, Justice Stevens still refused to allow 
the creditors to discount the plan payments at this rate and implied 
that such a characteristic of a market was not indicative of its efficiency.  
Moreover, he made it clear that the purpose of the cramdown rate is 
solely to ensure that the present value of the creditor’s future cash 
flows under the plan equaled the amount of its allowed secured claim.  
Allowing a secured lender to receive the equivalent of what it could 
receive if it were to foreclose on the collateral and invest the proceeds 
in such “efficient” debt instruments seems to contradict this policy con-
cern.  As stated above, Justice Stevens offered no justification for why 
this concern should not apply in chapter 11, and the dissent appeared 
to concur with this principle.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
why would the Court redefine the term “efficient market” without ex-
plaining the new definition in this context when it has a well-estab-
lished legal definition that has laid the foundation for numerous Su-
preme Court opinions and serves as the basis for the federal securities 
laws?  In sum, many of these suggested interpretations of footnote 14 
contain significant flaws, and it is therefore necessary to look at the 
footnote from different angles.185 
As footnote 14 is both ambiguous and prone to criticism from a 
bankruptcy practitioner’s perspective, prior Supreme Court cases may 
be consulted to get a better idea of the true meaning of the term “effi-
cient markets.”186  The seminal case on this issue, Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
provides some useful guidance.187  A major question before the Su-
preme Court in Basic Inc. was whether a corporation’s false statements 
denying that it was in merger negotiations, which induced a share-
holder to sell artificially depressed shares of the defendant’s stock, can 
be deemed “material” in a securities fraud claim.188  In order to plead 
 
 185  See Wong, supra note 4, at 1953–54 (“The plurality did suggest that an efficient 
market analysis should apply to Chapter 11 cramdowns, but it failed to provide a work-
able definition of efficient market.”).  But see A Deep Dive into Till v. SCS Credit Corp—
Part VII: How to Understand Footnote 14, supra note 184 (arguing that the footnote refers 
to a colloquy in oral argument and should not be relied on in chapter 11). 
 186  For an alternative perspective arguing that the “efficient market comment” in 
footnote 14 simply refers to usury laws in consumer lending, see Thompson & 
McDonough, supra note 4, at 913–14 (asserting that the footnote referenced a specific 
colloquy from oral argument and should not be interpreted as having any significant 
precedential value in the chapter 11 context). 
 187  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); see also Wong, supra note 4, at 1948 
(“Although Till did not define the term ‘efficient market,’ the term has appeared quite 
frequently in other areas of law, especially securities litigation.”). 
 188  Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 227–35. 
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a securities fraud claim, a plaintiff must show the element of reliance.189  
More specifically, the court addressed the question of whether a plain-
tiff in a Rule 10b-5 action is entitled to a presumption of reliance on 
the theory that, in a non-face-to-face transaction, he relied on the mar-
ket price of the security in ascertaining its actual value.190  Noting that 
“[r]ecent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise 
that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all 
publicly available information, and, hence, any material misrepresenta-
tions,”191 the Court wrote that spreading false information about a cor-
poration undermines an investor’s expectation that a security’s price 
should paint an accurate picture of the company—an actionable claim 
under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 that the Court deemed the 
“fraud on the market theory.”192  And those “empirical studies” to which 
Basic Inc. referred, the foundation of the fraud on the market theory, 
form the basis of what economists call the “Efficient Capital Markets 
Hypothesis” (ECMH).193  Indeed, the ECMH is a major driving force 
behind today’s securities laws, and its application in legal matters is 
widespread.  “Of all recent developments in financial economics, the 
efficient capital market hypothesis (‘ECMH’) has achieved the widest 
acceptance by the legal culture.”194 
In spite of the fact that lawyers and judges alike have embraced 
the ECMH, practitioners often fail to correctly apply its principles in 
the legal setting.  “[T]he legal culture’s remarkably rapid and broad 
acceptance of [the ECMH] is not matched by an equivalent degree of 
understanding.”195  Such a strong statement invites three important 
questions.  First, how does the ECMH define “efficient markets?”  Sec-
ond, does it make sense that Justice Stevens and the plurality intended 
for this definition to apply in the cramdown rate context?  And finally, 
are debt markets efficient in the context of distressed debt and loans 
to companies emerging from chapter 11? 
 
 
 
 189  5 Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Bromberg & Lowenfels on Securities 
Fraud and Commodities Fraud § 7.431 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter Bromberg & Low-
enfels Treatise]. 
 190  See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 228. 
 191  Id. at 246 (emphasis added).  
 192  Id. at 247. 
 193  Id. at 253 n.4 (White, J., dissenting). 
 194  See id. (quoting Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Mar-
ket Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 549–50 (1984)).  
 195  Id.   
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1. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis and its Three 
Forms 
In the broadest terms, the “ECMH [holds] that the prices of secu-
rities traded in public capital markets fully reflect all information con-
cerning those securities.”196  This is precisely the foundation of the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Basic Inc.197 
The ECMH posits three distinct types of efficient markets: the 
weak form, the semi-strong form, and the strong form.198  Weak form 
efficiency implies that “current security prices fully reflect all infor-
mation consisting of past security prices.”199  In other words, security 
price changes are independent of past price changes—a classic “ran-
dom walk.”200  Any price change can result only from the production of 
new information.201  Semi-strong form efficiency implies that security 
prices reflect all past and present publicly available information about 
the underlying company.202  The strong form of the ECMH holds that 
all information, both public and non-public, is reflected in a security’s 
current price.203  Under this model, it is impossible for an investor to 
generate returns in excess of the market index over the long-term as 
market prices instantaneously incorporate all material public and non-
public information.204  It is important to note that the ECMH does not 
suggest that positive long-run returns are impossible in an efficient 
market.  Rather, in an efficient market, “it is not possible to find ex-
pected returns greater (or less) than the risk-adjusted opportunity cost 
of capital.”205 
Now that a definition of market efficiency has been established, it 
makes sense to pause for a moment to consider how this definition is 
relevant to the footnote 14 analysis.  After all, if courts in the chapter 
11 context have applied a different definition of efficiency, one may 
 
 196  Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Ge-
nealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 559 (1994).  
 197  See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 245–46 (“In drafting that [Securities Exchange Act], 
Congress expressly relied on the premise that securities markets are affected by infor-
mation, and enacted legislation to facilitate an investor’s reliance on the integrity of 
those markets.”).  
 198  Cunningham, supra note 196. 
 199  Id. at 560. 
 200  See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 355. 
 201  Cunningham, supra note 196, at 560. 
 202  Id. 
 203  Id.  
 204  Id.   
 205  See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 328. 
GREEN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2016  1:34 PM 
1184 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1151 
potentially question the ECMH’s relevance.206  When viewed through 
the lens of the ECMH, however, the purpose of the market-based ap-
proach suggested in Till footnote 14 becomes more evident.  In the 
main text of the opinion, the plurality held that the purpose of the 
cramdown rate was to provide an accurate gauge of the debtor’s credit 
risk and to ensure that the equation in Figure 6 balances.  While it did 
suggest that the coerced loan approach may make sense in chapter 11, 
it never expressly stated that this policy concern is no longer the driv-
ing factor in a chapter 11 cramdown rate analysis. 
The ECMH, however, can help to reconcile these two apparently 
contradictory concerns: comparable market rates may be helpful to the 
extent that they fully reflect all of the underlying information about 
the borrower.  A market rate that is an accurate reflection of the 
debtor’s risk of default will ensure that the Figure 6 equation bal-
ances;207 if the market is not efficient, the obtained rate may fail to do 
so, as the coupon “C” may differ significantly from the yield “r.”  Put 
another way, a coupon payment that is a function of “the time value of 
[the secured lender’s] money and the risk of default” 208 should equal 
what that debt instrument would yield in an efficient secondary mar-
ket.  This ensures that the secured lender’s claim is paid out at 100 
cents on the dollar.  As stated above, the expected rate of return on 
the investment should equal the risk-adjusted opportunity cost of cap-
ital and any difference may be indicative of an inefficient market.209 
The issue of whether market rates fully reflect the information 
underlying a chapter 11 debtor can be addressed by looking at real-
world studies on the validity of the ECMH and the fraud on the market 
cases involving debt and equity securities.  As suggested in Basic Inc., 
empirical testing has confirmed that semi-strong form efficiency may 
exist in some equity markets.210  Moreover, it is possible that the strong 
 
 206  Pill, supra note 4, at 290 (“While the term ‘efficient market’ has a commonly 
used definition in securities litigation, the question remains whether bankruptcy 
courts will transpose the definition into the bankruptcy arena.”).  
 207  LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 48 (noting that the proper discount rate should take 
into account the default risk, inflation risk, and duration risk).  See also Wong, supra 
note 4, at 1947 (“[A]n efficient market rate of interest may accurately capture the pre-
sent value of the secured claim, thus fulfilling the fair-and-equitable requirement of 
the cramdown provisions.”). 
 208  Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477 (2004). 
 209  See Michael Vitti, Is Momentive a Bigger Deal than Typically Reported, or is it Much 
Ado About Nothing?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2016, at 40, 109 (“The expected economic 
profit for a loan issued in an efficient market is (near) zero because the interest will 
just cover the opportunity cost of capital.”).  
 210  See generally, e.g., J. M. Patell & M. A. Wolfson, The Intraday Speed of Adjustment of 
Stock Prices to Earnings and Dividend Announcements, 13 J. FIN. ECON., no. 2, 1984, at 223, 
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form of the ECMH may also have some real-world applicability.  “[Re-
search on] strong-form efficiency has proved to be sufficiently convinc-
ing that many professionally managed funds have given up the pursuit 
of superior performance.  They simply ‘buy the index’ . . . .”211  The 
ECMH, however, remains prone to criticism from both the legal and 
financial community.  Professor James Cox has noted that, “[t]hough 
[the ECMH] is a cornerstone on which much of securities law has been 
built, the efficient market hypothesis continues to be surrounded by 
controversy as scholars from the fields of economics and finance seri-
ously question whether the model fully captures investor behavior . . . 
or, for that matter, whether the model can ever be validated or discred-
ited.”212  Still, the legal community and the courts accept the notion 
that, at the bare minimum, semi-strong form efficiency exists in today’s 
equity markets, a notion validated by numerous empirical studies.213  
Despite courts’ acceptance of the ECMH in cases involving stock pric-
ing, the case law and financial literature is less clear with regard to debt 
instruments—precisely the type of securities courts approve in a typical 
chapter 11 cramdown.214 
 
 
 
 
 
223–52.  Semi-strong efficiency is generally tested by examining a security price’s reac-
tion time to the disclosure of material information.  Id.  
 211  BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 362; but see Cunningham, supra note 196, at 561 
(“The insider trading scandals of the 1980s are among the many proofs that the strong 
from of the ECMH is invalid.”).   
 212  JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 96–97 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Busi-
ness, 7th ed. 2013) (citing R.A. HAUGEN, THE NEW FINANCE: THE CASE AGAINST EFFICIENT 
MARKETS (1995)); see also James Tobin, On the Efficiency of the Financial System, LLOYDS 
BANK REV., July 1984, at 1, https://economicsociologydotorg. 
files.wordpress.com/2014/12/tobin-on-the-efficiency-of-the-financial-system.pdf.  
 213  BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 362. 
 214  See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & “ERISA” 
Litig.), 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 748 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“[N]o standard at all appears to 
have been established for measuring market efficiency for debt securities.  Adding to 
that difficulty, thus far there is little scholarly literature about, and only a few courts 
have addressed, market efficiency for bonds.”); see also Chris Downing et al., The Rela-
tive Informational Efficiency of Stocks and Bonds: An Intraday Analysis, J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, Oct. 2009, at 1081, 1081–82 (noting that because the “market 
for corporate bonds has long been relatively opaque[,] . . . previous studies of the 
relation between stock and bond returns have drawn conflicting conclusions from 
dealer quotes of uncertain quality, or narrow datasets that leave the generality of the 
results open to question”). 
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2. Efficiency of the Markets Relevant to Chapter 11 
Proceedings: Secondary Trading Markets, Small Cap 
Firms, Distressed Firms, and Primary Markets 
As described above, “the [ECMH] applies to all types of invest-
ment assets.”215  Nonetheless, the hypothesis has been tested primarily 
on equity markets.216  “After all, stocks have the most liquid and trans-
parent trading markets, so if the theory applies anywhere, it should 
apply to stocks.”217  Efforts to improve the transparency of the corporate 
bond and secured loan markets began in the early 2000s, and, as a re-
sult, the topic of credit market efficiency has not been studied as ex-
tensively.218 
Even without numerous conclusive studies to guide their analysis, 
courts can look at the assumptions behind the ECMH in determining 
whether a market for a security is efficient.  As Professor Lubben noted 
above, liquidity and transparent trading markets are two key assump-
tions behind the ECMH.219  Other assumptions include “a large num-
ber of participants such that the actions of any individual participant 
cannot materially affect the market . . . fully informed [market partici-
pants], [participants] have equal access to the market, and act ration-
ally; the commodity is homogeneous; and there are no transaction 
costs.”220  These assumptions appear to be reasonable with respect to 
common stocks.  The common shares of many public corporations 
trade on highly centralized exchanges with strict transparency stand-
ards.221  Numerous individuals place trades on these exchanges every 
 
 215  LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 93. 
 216  Id.  
 217  Id.   
 218  See, e.g., Chris Downing et al., supra note 214, at 1082 (“In recent years, the [Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers] has made sweeping reforms of the reporting 
requirements for over-the-counter corporate bond transactions in an effort to improve 
the transparency of the market, culminating in the public dissemination of infor-
mation on most corporate bond transactions.”); Cheng Ying, The Informational Effi-
ciency of the Corporate Bond Market (July 2006) (Masters of Science in Finance The-
sis) (“Beginning on July 1, 2002, the National Association of Securities Dealers . . . 
requires all bond dealers to report their transactions through its Trade Reporting and 
Compliance Engine [TRACE] System.”). 
 219  See Cunningham, supra note 187. 
 220  See generally id.; see also Wong, supra note 4, at 1948 (citing Jonathan R. Macey et 
al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic 
v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1991)). 
 221  See generally Listed Company Manuel, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (Apr. 22, 2016, 
10:25 PM), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections/.   
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day, and companies are subject to countless information-disclosure re-
quirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.222  Further-
more, because these companies have such large market capitalizations, 
it may be difficult for an individual to materially affect the market by 
himself.223  District courts have relied upon these assumptions in deter-
mining whether the market for a company’s common stock is effi-
cient.224  In Cammer v. Bloom, the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey looked at five factors when making this inquiry: 
(1) trade volume and liquidity; (2) the existence of analyst coverage; 
(3) the presence of market makers and arbitrageurs; (4) eligibility to 
participate in the SEC’s integrated disclosure procedures; and (5) the 
stock’s responsiveness to new corporate information.225  Not surpris-
ingly, these “Cammer factors” are nothing more than the assumptions 
behind the ECMH. 
While the Cammer factors are still relevant in determining whether 
a market for a company’s debt is efficient, a few important distinctions 
in the analysis are worth nothing.  First, courts have stated that the 
analysis must be conducted “with a view to [bonds’] distinctive nature 
and to the kinds of news that would move their market price in contrast 
to the kind of information that might affect the more volatile stock 
market.”226  Because the primary determinants of a debt instrument’s 
price are the nominal value of the periodic payment “C” and the prob-
ability of a default, the underlying information pertaining to the com-
pany’s financial health (i.e. risk of default) is most relevant in this con-
text.227  This makes sense since corporate bondholders typically do not 
stand to benefit from the issuer’s potential upside to the same extent 
 
 222  See generally COX ET AL., supra note 212, at 9–10 (providing an overview of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 223  For example, as of November 5, 2014, Apple Inc.’s ten largest institutional 
shareholders own a combined twenty-three percent of the company.  Each one of these 
institutions holds Apple stock in its ETFs and Mutual funds on behalf of thousands of 
investors worldwide.  See Apple Inc., YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.ya-
hoo.com/q/mh?s=AAPL+Major+Holders (last visited Nov. 5, 2014, 4:30 PM).  
 224  See, e.g., Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989). 
 225  Id. at 1286–87.  Factor 5, responsiveness to new information, tends to be the 
method by which economists have empirically validated the semi-strong form of the 
ECMH.  It is also considered the most important factor in the analysis.  See id. at 1287 
(“This, after all, is the essence of an efficient market and the foundation for the fraud 
on the market theory.”).  
 226  Newby v. Enron Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 749 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
 227  See id. at 755–56.  See also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, 
Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market-Theory, 42 STANFORD L. REV. 1059, 
1085 (1990) (“[I]t seems clear that not all corporate information will affect all securi-
ties of a given issuer in the same way.  Debt securities will be more insulated from the 
shocks associated with bad news than will equity securities.”).  
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as shareholders.  Even in a perfectly efficient market, information that 
may increase the price of the firm’s common stock might have no ef-
fect on the firm’s bond price.228  When the likelihood of default in-
creases and the firm approaches insolvency, however, any information 
pertaining to the firm’s value and credit risk can be expected to have 
a significant impact on the bond’s price under the ECMH.229  Moreo-
ver, two variables as opposed to one are relevant: the bond’s price and 
yield.  As discussed in Part II, a bond’s price and yield are inversely 
related, and the appropriate question in determining the bond’s effi-
ciency is whether or not these two variables accurately capture the in-
formation relevant to the default risk.  As a result, some courts have 
noted that the Cammer factors are not as helpful in the context of debt 
securities.230  Nonetheless, they can provide a court with a threshold 
indication of a debt instrument’s informational efficiency.231  Accord-
ingly, the relevant inquiry is the degree to which the presence of these 
factors indicates that the bond/note’s price and yield are a function of 
all material information indicative of the company’s default risk (the 
“Modified Cammer factors”). 
The idea that debt markets exhibit the same degree of efficiency 
as equity markets has been met with some skepticism from lawyers and 
economists alike.232  This makes sense when analyzing the Cammer fac-
 
 228  In re HealthSouth Corp. Secs. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 635–36 (N.D. Ala. 2009) 
(“Information that may be material to a stock price, such as the announcement of a 
dividend, may not be material for a bond investor whose fixed return would not be 
affected.  In contrast, the price of bonds may be affected by general, non-company 
specific information, such as changes in risk-free interest rates, that would not affect 
stock prices.”).  
 229  See Downing et al., supra note 214 (“Because the BBB- and junk-rated bonds are 
closer to default, the expected cash flows and hence prices of these bonds react to 
news about the firm’s cash flows, albeit at a lag relative to their associated equity owing 
to the relative inefficiency of the bond market.”). 
 230  Id. at 755. 
 231  Id. at 752.  See also Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bom-
bardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 210 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We conclude, however, that the dis-
trict court properly used the Cammer factors as an ‘analytical tool’ [in the debt con-
text].”) (quoting Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2005)); In re 
Petrobras Sec. Litig., 14-cv-9662 (JSR), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12286, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 2, 2016) (“Although the Cammer factors were not designed for debt securities . . . 
[t]he Court agrees that the modified Cammer factors provide a useful rubric to evaluate 
debt markets.”); In re NII Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1:14-CV-227(LMB/JFA), 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 156034, at *18 (E.D. Va. Nov. 17, 2015) (“Although the showings to estab-
lish market efficiency for bond markets differs from the showing for stock exchanges, 
courts tend to employ the Cammer factors as an analytical tool when determining 
whether bonds traded in an efficient market.”). 
 232  See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, When Debt Markets Don’t Really Act as Markets, N.Y. 
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tors.  Major companies with stock trading on large U.S. exchanges reg-
ister their shares in accordance with the Securities Act of 1933, making 
such shares freely tradable and providing easy liquidity for investors.233  
Corporate debt, however, is often sold privately through various ex-
emptions from registration under the Securities Act of 1933.234  Some 
of these securities may be restricted and, unlike their equity counter-
parts, may not be freely tradable and some may not fall under the pur-
view of the Securities Act at all.235  Furthermore, many debt instruments 
trade over-the-counter (OTC).236  In OTC markets, an investor must 
often “search for a buyer, incurring opportunity or other costs until 
one is found.”237  The process of obtaining a “bid and ask”238 is often a 
strategic bargaining process.239  The end result is less liquidity and in-
formation and bargaining asymmetries.240  “Fundamentally, corporate 
bond funds often hold large positions in bonds that don’t trade in 
 
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2014, 3:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/when-
debt-markets-don’t-really-act-as-markets/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0; Downing et 
al., supra note 214, at 1083 (noting that contrary to results of prior empirical studies, 
the authors dataset “indicate[s] that the bond market is in general less informationally 
efficient than the equity market”).  But see Edith S. Hotchkiss & Tavy Ronen, The Infor-
mational Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market: An Intraday Analysis, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 
1325, 1327 (2002) (concluding that firm-specific information is “incorporated as 
quickly into bond prices as into prices of the underlying stock”). 
 233  See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012) (prohibiting the sale of securities for 
which no registration statement is in effect). 
 234  See LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 196. 
 235  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (exempting certain notes from Section 5 regis-
tration requirements); § 77c(a)(9) (exempting debt instruments issued under certain 
exchange offers and out of court plans of restructuring); § 77c(a)(10) (exempting 
certificates issued by a DIP in a chapter 11 case).  See also 17 CFR 230.144A (2016) 
(commonly known as a “Rule 144A Offering;” this “safe-harbor” enables issuers to sell 
corporate debt to “Qualified Institutional Buyers” while avoiding the registration re-
quirements of Section 5); STANDARD & POOR’S, A GUIDE TO THE LOAN MARKET 9 (2011), 
https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf (“Because loans are not se-
curities, this will be a confidential offering made only to qualified banks and accredited 
investors.”).  
 236  See Newby v. Enron Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 748 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“Bonds 
are usually traded in the over-the-counter market.”).  
 237  Darrell Duffie et al., Over-The-Counter Markets, 73 ECONOMETRICA 1815, 1815 
(2005).  
 238  In finance, the “bid-ask spread” is defined as the difference between the price 
at which the buyer is willing to buy and at which the seller is willing to sell.  Low bid-
ask spreads are common on centralized exchanges because there are many market 
participants.  A low bid-ask may be indicative of an efficient market as wider spreads 
may indicated information asymmetries, transaction costs, or unequal bargaining po-
sitions.  See LUBBEN, supra note 52, at 196. 
 239 Duffie et al., supra note 237. 
 240  See, e.g., Lubben, supra note 232; see also Downing et al., supra note 214, at 1083 
(“[T]he transaction costs for corporate bonds remain relatively high compared to eq-
uities.”). 
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large amounts each day.”241  This relatively low trade volume (when 
compared to the stock market) appears to suggest that debt markets in 
general are less liquid than their equity counterparts.  While courts 
have noted that over-the-counter trading is not dispositive, the trading 
still may lend itself towards a finding of inefficiency.242 
In response to these arguments, proponents of the efficient mar-
ket theory’s applicability to credit markets have noted that the Cammer 
factors such as liquidity, trade volume, and the presence of market 
makers must be analyzed differently with respect to bonds.243  For ex-
ample, when a firm’s financial health is strong and improving by the 
day, a high trade volume should not be expected as the probability of 
repayment is strong even before the positive news.244  In fact, a spike in 
trade volume in response to this immaterial information may be indic-
ative of inefficiency.245  Distressed debt, on the other hand, may be more 
sensitive to the type of information that may influence equity price.246 
Moreover, as stated above, some commentators have noted that 
over-the-counter trading on its own should not be enough to establish 
the inefficiency of a debt instrument.247  One court has also held that 
“whether market makers in the over-the-counter-market, specifically 
the market for [the particular security], provided a sufficiently fluid 
and informed trading environment so that when material information 
about [the issuer] was disseminated, investors had available to them an 
opportunity to trade at informed, and therefore appropriate, bid and 
asked prices.”248  Moreover, some have argued that despite the fact that 
these instruments trade over-the-counter with a low frequency, the ma-
jor financial institutions that hold significant bond positions are so-
phisticated parties and are better able to distill all material publically 
available information and incorporate this information into the price 
and yield.  “[Plaintiff’s expert] argued that . . . [bond markets are] 
 
 241  Lubben, supra note 232.  
 242  Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1281 (D.N.J. 1989).   
 243  See Michael L. Hartzmark et al., Fraud on the Market: Analysis of the Efficiency of the 
Corporate Bond Market, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 654 (2001).   
 244  See id. at 689. 
 245  Id. (“[I]f information or opinions do not change each day, yet there is high 
frequency of trading, this might be a sign that that security actually trades in an ineffi-
cient market that possibly resembles a casino.”). 
 246  See, e.g., Downing et al., supra note 214, at 1094 (“The results for hourly returns 
in Panel B provide support for the notion that lower-rated bonds are more equity-like 
and hence sensitive to firm-specific news.”).  
 247  Hartzmark et al., supra note 243, at 694–95. 
 248  In re HealthSouth Corp. Secs. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 639 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (quot-
ing Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1283 (D.N.J. 1989)). 
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substantially composed of large QIBs, with trained staffs and substan-
tial research capabilities that keep them well informed, ensure[ing] 
the market is informationally efficient.”249  This is also evident in the 
market for leveraged loans, commonly used as proxies in chapter 11 
cramdowns, where lenders have ready access to a plethora of material 
non-public information.250  Commentators have noted that the “moni-
toring role” of banks in this context may support a finding that loan 
markets are efficient.251 
The claim that secondary credit markets are efficient, however, 
may break down in the context of small-cap firms.  This distinction is 
highly relevant because although large chapter 11 cases tend to receive 
the most publicity, they are nonetheless relatively rare.252  The research 
of Professors Eugene Fama and Kenneth French has shown that the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model, closely linked with the assumptions of the 
ECMH, fails to adequately predict returns for smaller firms.253  In ap-
praisal proceedings in Delaware, courts have accepted the use of the 
 
 249  Newby v. Enron Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 767 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
 250 See STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 235; see generally Edward I. Altman et al., Bank 
Debt Versus Bond Debt: Evidence from Secondary Market Prices, J. MONEY CREDIT & BANK., 
June 2010, at 755.  
 251  A Deep Dive into Till v. SCS Credit Corp.—Part IX: The Loan Market Appears to 
Satisfy Any Reasonable Standard for an Efficient Market, THE NECESSARY AND PROPER BLOG 
(Jan. 3, 2014, 4:11 PM), http://thenecessaryandproperblog. 
blogspot.com/2014/01/a-deep-dive-into-till-v-scs-credit-corp_6300.html (noting that 
the Altman study “supports the thesis that the ‘monitoring’ role of the loan agree-
ment’s covenants gives its holders better or at least more timely information and fur-
ther that such information has value in terms of achieving a greater recovery for its 
recipients”).  
 252  For example, the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database notes that out 
of 1039 cases sampled, only sixty-one companies had a total asset value of ten billion 
dollars and over.  Three hundred and ninety-two companies fell in the one to ten 
billion dollar range.  Nearly one-third of the cases sampled fell between $500 million 
and $1 billion, while a slightly larger number contained assets less than $500 million.  
UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW (Feb. 20, 2016, 12:08 
PM), http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/design_a_study.asp.  Mid-cap stocks are generally 
defined as companies whose market value of equity exceeds two billion dollars.  Rick 
Wayman, Understanding Small- and Big-Cap Stocks, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.in-
vestopedia.com/articles/analyst/010502.asp (last visited May 7, 2016).  Because the 
assets of an insolvent company tend to greatly outweigh equity, a substantial portion 
of the surveyed cases that fall in the one to ten billion dollar range are likely to be 
considered “small-cap” companies.  It should be noted that courts making determina-
tions of a debt security’s efficiency tend to focus on the market value of a company’s 
debt instead.  Nonetheless, the general proposition that companies with a book value 
of assets between one to ten billion dollars may be considered small-cap under certain 
circumstances may still be applicable.   
 253  Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Dissecting Anomalies, 63 J. FIN. 1653 (2008); but 
see Cunningham, supra note 196, at 569 (“[I]n evaluating the ECMH, the need for a 
pricing model creates the joint-hypothesis problem: one can never be certain in testing 
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relevant “Ibbotson Premium” in order to reconcile this difference.254  
This makes sense as many of the prerequisites for an efficient market 
are no longer present in the realm of small and microcap companies.255  
These companies tend to exhibit fewer trades, less liquidity, less trans-
parency, less analyst coverage, and more susceptibility to market ma-
nipulation than their large-cap counterparts.256  In light of this, one 
prominent corporate finance professor has noted that “the small firm 
could be an important exception to the efficient market theory, an ex-
ception that gave investors the opportunity for consistently superior 
returns over a period of two decades.”257  Indeed, courts have taken 
market cap into consideration in securities regulation cases; a larger 
market cap bodes in favor of a finding of efficiency.258 
A second relevant market in a chapter 11 cramdown is the market 
for distressed debt.259  The markets for such instruments may be less 
likely to exhibit efficiency as the assumptions behind the ECMH break 
down even further in this context.  First, distressed debt investing tends 
to be limited to a small group of investment professionals, most of 
 
a model whether rejections of it are required because of market inefficiency or because 
of an inadequately specified asset pricing model.”).  
 254  Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp., No. 18648-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 12, 
at *31–32 (Del Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (“Under CAPM the cost of equity is equal to the risk-
free rate (the yield on 20 year Treasury bonds) plus a large company equity risk pre-
mium multiplied by the specific company adjusted beta for JR Cigar.  Added to this 
figure is an equity size premium.  An equity size premium is added because smaller 
companies have higher returns on average than larger ones . . . [and] small companies 
have a higher cost of equity.”).  Plugging a company’s beta into the CAPM tends to 
produce a greater discrepancy with actual returns as the company’s market cap de-
creases.   
 255  See generally Microcap Stocks: A Guide for Investors, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/in-
vestor/pubs/microcapstock.htm (last modified Sept. 18, 2013). 
 256  See id. (“Many microcap companies do not file financial reports with the SEC, 
so it’s hard for investors to get the facts about the company’s management, products, 
services, and finances.”).  
 257  BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 364. 
 258  See, e.g., In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 312 F.R.D. 354, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Put 
simply, Petrobras was one of the largest and most-analyzed firms in the world through-
out the Class Period, and such size and sophistication raise the likelihood of an effi-
cient market.”); Paul A. Ferrillo et al., The “Less Than” Efficient Capital Markets Hypothe-
sis: Requiring More Proof from Plaintiffs in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
81, 101 (2004) (“[M]arket capitalization . . . may be an indicator of market efficiency 
because there is a greater incentive for stock purchasers to invest in more highly capi-
talized corporations.”) (quoting Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 
2001)).  Moreover, the Hotchkiss study referenced supra note 232 analyzed a dataset 
containing firms with a median book value of assets of $1820.2 million.   
 259  This definition includes both leveraged loans and distressed bonds/notes as se-
cured bond issuances are becoming a more common method for distressed firms to 
raise capital.  
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whom attempt to “make money on mispriced assets.”260  This under-
mines the first assumption of the ECMH: a large number of market 
participants.  A robust market with a large number of participants may 
more accurately reflect an informed consensus on the underlying 
firm’s true value or credit risk, and the potential for pricing inefficien-
cies is greater when few informed participants are present.  In fact, one 
study on this issue concluded that junk bonds display relatively less ef-
ficiency than do investment grade bonds and tend to be issued in 
smaller denominations.261  As suggested by this study, distressed debt 
investors may be able to identify credit investments with artificially low 
prices and high yields.  Closely related to this factor is the ability of one 
market participant to manipulate the market as a whole.  This very na-
ture of distressed debt investing makes this a plausible reality.  The 
emergence of credit default swaps (CDSs) has also altered many mar-
ket participants’ incentives as investors may stand to gain by putting 
downward pressure on a company’s bond price and forcing a company 
into bankruptcy.  While betting against a security occurs in all markets, 
when one individual actor holds a sizable stake in a distressed firm, his 
or her ability to affect the market price seems inconsistent with the 
notion of an efficient market. 
With respect to the primary market for syndicated loans to entities 
similar to a chapter 11 debtor, the applicability of the ECMH is also 
questionable.262  This is significant: in the line of cases employing the 
two-part efficiency analysis, courts focus on the market for loans to bor-
rowers similar to the debtor.263  In Momentive, for example, the court 
specifically rejected the use of proposed exit facility rates as proxies.264  
By definition, however, a primary market for debt does not involve any 
 
 260  Lubben, supra note 232.  See also Downing et al., supra note 214, at 1101 (finding 
that “stock returns predict returns on BBB- and junk-rated nonconvertible bonds at 
both and hourly frequencies”).  Such a conclusion is akin to a finding that the market 
for distressed bonds may be inefficient.   
 261  See Downing et al., supra note 214, at 1086 (“Lower credit quality issuers tend to 
be smaller firms—the average market capitalization of AAA issuers is about 70 times 
larger than that of junk issuers.”).  
 262  See Newby v. Enron Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 769 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“There is 
a line of cases conclusorily holding that primary bond markets per se are not open and 
have not developed at all, and thus the theory should not apply.”).  But see AAL High 
Yield Bond Fund v. Ruttenberg, 229 F.R.D. 676, 684–85, 685 n.9 (N.D. Ala. 2005). 
 263  See, e.g., In re 20 Bayard Views, LLC, 445 B.R. 83, 109 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“[C]onsideration should be given to the ‘current market rates’ for loans that are ‘sim-
ilar in term, quality of security, and risk of repayment or financial condition of the 
borrower.’”) (quoting In re One Times Square Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 159 B.R. 695, 706 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)). 
 264  In re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *85 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014). 
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sort of trading mechanism by which yield rates can react to new infor-
mation based on a large informed consensus of the marketplace.265  
Creditors of distressed companies and firms in chapter 11 often wield 
considerable influence in setting the loan’s terms and may base their 
pricing models on factors unrelated to the loan itself.266  The Momentive 
court noted that “[t]his should not be surprising because it is highly 
unlikely that there will ever be an efficient market that does not in-
clude a profit element, fees and costs.”267 
While it is certainly true that a secured creditor is entitled to a 
positive return on its investment, the economic profit of the lender 
should nonetheless be zero.268  One commentator has recently noted 
that “[t]he key nuance is presumably market efficiency.  The expected 
economic profit for a loan issued in an efficient market is (near) zero 
because the interest will just cover the opportunity cost of capital.  The 
expected economic profit in an inefficient market, on the other hand, 
can be greater than zero.”269  Moreover, distressed business lenders may 
implement market control by demanding a substantial premium over 
investment-grade loans, imposing numerous restrictive covenants in 
the credit agreement, wielding considerable control over the debtor’s 
business, bargaining for options to convert the debt into common 
stock, imposing numerous fees and other forms of consideration, and 
aggressively pursuing default remedies such as the “loan to own strat-
egy” commonly exerted by secured lenders in chapter 11.270  Addition-
ally, the small number of market participants may ensure that the pro-
posed rate exceeds the true risk of non-payment.  If this were the case, 
the present value of the future cash flows would exceed the amount of 
the secured lender’s claim.  While some commentators have put forth 
 
 265  See, e.g., Bromberg & Lowenfels Treatise, supra note 189, § 7.484(3) (“[N]ew 
issue markets can rarely be efficient when they begin.  They are one way [selling] ra-
ther than two way [buying and selling] markets.  A single price is commonly fixed by 
the underwriters and issuers, although usually with reference to the prevailing market 
for similar securities.”).   
 266  See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 235, at 15 (noting that “banks are driven 
by the overall profitability of the issuer relationship, including noncredit revenue 
sources”).  
 267  In re MPM Silicones, LLC, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3926, at *86.  
 268  Vitti, supra note 209, at 108–09 (discussing the distinction between accounting 
profits and economic profits and how it pertains to the cramdown analysis). 
 269  Id. at 109. 
 270  See generally Log on Am. v. Promethean Asset Management, 223 F. Supp. 2d 435 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (distressed debtor-plaintiff entered into a “death spiral” convertible 
credit agreement on highly unfavorable terms due to its inability procure financing 
from any other market sources).   
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compelling arguments that pricing loans based on market compara-
bles may ensure that the primary market is efficient,271 the considera-
tions discussed above should, at the bare minimum, call into question 
whether these exit facilities for companies emerging from chapter 11 
are as efficient as the broader market for syndicated loans.272 
More fundamentally, many critics argue that the ECMH tends to 
overlook the true nature of human behavior by assuming that all inves-
tors make decisions in a rational manner.273  These critics of the model 
point to various financial bubbles as evidence that individuals often 
overreact to material information.274  Such thinking can carry over to 
the chapter 11 context, where investors’ fears of the potential instabil-
ity of both pre- and post-confirmation debtors may lead to abnormally 
high interest rates and erratic price movements.  For example, when 
Momentive’s replacement notes began trading, the yields immediately 
rose to 6.2%.275  Whether this rate was a function of the debtor’s true 
credit risk or a product of the market’s overreaction to the bench rul-
ing is unclear.  While the ECMH has been lauded as one of the greatest 
achievements of modern financial theory, these psychological con-
cerns have led one prominent corporate finance expert to note that 
 
 271  See, e.g., A Deep Dive into Till v. SCS Credit Corp.—Part IX: The Loan Market Ap-
pears to Satisfy Any Reasonable Standard for an Efficient Market, supra note 251 (“The best 
evidence that the current US market for senior secured loans is efficient lies in the fact 
that, when a bank is arranging a large secured loan of any size for a commercial client, 
the arranger refers to comps in the loan market to estimate the pricing on the loan.”); 
see also STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 235, at 16 (noting that the use of mark-to-market 
data has “made the [loan] market more transparent, improved price discovery and, in 
doing so, made the market far more efficient and dynamic than it was in the past.  In 
the primary market, for instance, leveraged loan spreads are now determined not only 
by rating and leverage profile, but also by trading levels of an issuer’s previous loans 
and, often, bonds”).  
 272  See generally EDWARD I. ALTMAN & EDITH HOTCHKISS, CORPORATE FINANCIAL 
DISTRESS AND BANKRUPTCY (3d ed. 2006) (“The structure of Chapter 11 . . . may dis-
courage an active market for control of the assets of the bankrupt firm.  Oversight 
from the capital markets is reduced because management has access to debtor-in-pos-
session financing.  The securities of bankrupt firms trade infrequently . . . [p]erhaps 
as a result, there is often limited analyst coverage.  The absence of market forces makes 
valuation more complex and sometimes less precise.”); STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 
235, at 15 (noting that with respect to non-institutional investors, “it is an anachronism 
to continue to call [the primary market for loans] a ‘bank’ loan market”). 
 273  See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 884–85 (“Some researchers believe that 
the efficient-market hypothesis ignores important aspects of human behavior.  For ex-
ample, psychologists find that people tend to place too much emphasis on recent 
events when they are predicting the future.”). 
 274  Id. at 885 (citing CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A 
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (4th ed. 2000); ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL 
EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2000)). 
 275  Vitti, supra note 209, at 107.  
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“[m]uch more research is needed before we have a full understanding 
of why asset prices sometimes get so out of line with what appears to 
be their discounted future payoffs.”276  These qualitative criticisms 
should make one pause for a moment and consider whether bank-
ruptcy judges should accept the theory within the context of a market 
that has not experienced the same degree of empirical validation as 
the more commonly studied equity markets. 
3. Efficient Credit Markets and Till Footnote 14 
The considerations discussed above call into question whether the 
markets for loans to a company similar to a chapter 11 debtor can be 
truly efficient.  At the bare minimum, these considerations indicate 
that since Till, bankruptcy courts should re-examine the way they view 
the concept of market efficiency in light of the policy concerns out-
lined by the Supreme Court.  As the court in Momentive articulated, the 
“guiding principle” of Till is that the purpose of the discount rate is to 
ensure that the present value of the secured lender’s future cash flows 
equals its allowed secured claim.  Accordingly, the relevant inputs in 
the calculation are all factors contributing to the debtor’s default risk.  
The ECMH is entirely consistent with this notion.  As a result, the 
proper inquiry should be similar to the one conducted by courts ap-
plying the Modified Cammer factors in the context of debt securities 
fraud cases.  Only by doing so can a court determine if market compa-
rables paint an accurate picture of the debtor’s credit risk. 
Even if courts were to conduct a proper efficient markets analysis, 
however, the considerations discussed in Part V.B.2 indicate that such 
an inquiry may rarely support a finding of efficiency.  And as discussed 
in Part IV, courts using the current standard more often than not con-
clude that there is no efficient market and ultimately apply the formula 
approach.  This creates a significant problem both in terms of judicial 
resources drained and the financial burdens on a distressed debtor.  
An ECMH-based analysis would likely result in a lower “success rate” 
for the creditor and would be more costly for the parties, as the debtor 
would have to hire an expert witness to analyze the Modified Cammer 
factors.  “Unfortunately, this determination can only be made after 
both sides have exhausted considerable expenses to prove the pres-
ence of an efficient market, which may ultimately be ineffectual if the 
court determines that the market is not controlling and falls back to 
Till’s formula approach.”277  Such a result hardly seems desirable. 
 
 276  BREALEY ET AL., supra note 55, at 885. 
 277  Pill, supra note 4, at 295. 
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Another consideration is that efficiency is not an “all or nothing” 
concept.  Courts have recognized that there are varying degrees to 
which a debt security can be considered informationally efficient.278  In 
light of this, courts have permitted plaintiffs in securities fraud cases 
involving debt instruments to prevail on the efficiency analysis even 
when they did not demonstrate that the security was perfectly effi-
cient.279  Nonetheless, a crucial policy distinction is relevant in the 10b-
5 context: the importance of providing defrauded investors with an ad-
equate remedy at law without requiring an overly-stringent pleading 
threshold.280  Because this concern is not relevant in the chapter 11 
context, it makes sense that a higher bar for efficiency should be im-
plemented, since the whole point of the cramdown rate analysis is to 
ensure the accuracy of the market rate.  Such a consideration increases 
the probability that a court will find the market proxies as inefficient.  
The policy concern in the cramdown context is accuracy and not 
providing plaintiffs with an easier way to satisfy a prima facie element. 
In light of the above, the analysis conducted by courts following 
Till footnote 14 seems inconsistent with the policies laid out in the Till 
opinion, the Supreme Court’s definition of market efficiency, and the 
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis.  Loans of a given duration and 
risk comparable to those extended to borrowers exiting chapter 11 
may not necessarily yield the most accurate “risk that [a default] will 
occur.”281  Rather, they reflect unequal bargaining positions, transac-
tion costs, information asymmetries, and other factors that violate the 
ECMH.  As a result, these interest rates may not be the most accurate 
gauge of the debtor’s post-confirmation credit risk. 
The above notwithstanding, it is important to note that the fore-
going analysis is not meant to definitively suggest that credit markets 
do not exhibit informational efficiency.  Rather, the purpose of the 
 
 278  See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2414 (2014) 
(“[M]arket efficiency is not a yes-or-no proposition.”); Newby v. Enron Corp., 529 F. 
Supp. 2d 644, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“Efficiency is a relative concept, a matter of de-
gree.  As noted, the plaintiff need not satisfy all the Cammer/Unger/Bell factors to es-
tablish an efficient market even for stocks, and there is no absolute or established level 
of evidence to demonstrate any of the factors, such as average weekly trading volume, 
the number of analysts following the security, active market makers.”).  
 279  Newby, 529 F. Supp. 2d. at 750. 
 280  See id. at 749 (“Given the policy behind the federal securities laws of protecting 
securities investors from fraud, the Court finds it unreasonable that merely because 
bonds are not marketed in the same manner or as efficiently as stocks on national 
exchanges, one must conclude that the bond market is inefficient and thus defrauded 
bond investors should not have a right [to] use the fraud-on-the-market theory to per-
mit them to pursue class action litigation.”).  
 281  Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 491 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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analysis is to point out some of relative inefficiencies that may exist in 
distressed debt markets when compared to equity markets.  As noted 
by Justice Scalia in his Till dissent, eight of the Justices agreed that the 
purpose of the cramdown rate was to compensate the creditor for the 
risk of non-payment.  The only area of disagreement was which method 
produced the most accurate result.  It may very well be true that the 
formula approach may undercompensate creditors in certain circum-
stances.  As argued above, however, it may be just as likely that a mar-
ket-based approach will yield the same sort of inaccuracies.  In sum, 
this section of the Comment has argued that: (1) the purpose of the 
cramdown rate is to ensure that the present value of the secured cred-
itor’s future cash flows is equal to 100% of the allowed secured claim; 
(2) the potential uncertainty with respect to the efficiency of these 
market rates means that the present value calculation may exceed 
100%; and (3) in light of these potential flaws, courts should continue 
to apply a risk-adjusted cramdown rate until the efficiency of the pri-
mary and secondary markets for debt instruments is further validated. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the years after Till, courts across the country continued to apply 
different approaches to determine a cramdown rate in chapter 11 
cases.  The two predominant methods that emerged are the formula 
approach and the two-step coerced loan approach.  Courts applying 
the latter have tended to rely on Till footnote 14 as the guidepost for 
their analysis.  The public policy concerns outlined in the main body 
of the Till opinion, however, should outweigh the influence of foot-
note 14.  Cramdown rates exist to put a secured lender in the same 
position as one who receives a lump sum paying in satisfaction of his 
claim, not to help him capture additional profits.  Moreover, as noted 
by Justice Thomas in his Till dissent, there is no fundamental differ-
ence between the rate determination process in chapter 11 and chap-
ter 13.  Furthermore, adjusting the discount rate upward alleviates 
many financial burdens on the debtor and best comports with the 
bankruptcy court’s task of evaluating the feasibility of a debtor-in-pos-
session’s plan for reorganization.  Such an approach will maximize a 
corporate debtor’s chances of successfully emerging from bankruptcy. 
When viewed in conjunction with public policy considerations, 
the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the Efficient Capital Markets Hy-
pothesis in Basic Inc. indicates that the ECMH may be the fundamental 
underpinning of footnote 14.  Whether this was the Justices’ intended 
meaning or not, such a definition makes sense in light of the overall 
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purpose of the cramdown interest rate.  The small size of a typical chap-
ter 11 debtor, imperfect bargaining positions of a lender and a dis-
tressed borrower, and a small number of market participants all sug-
gest that the market for credit to companies in chapter 11 may never 
truly be “efficient” as defined by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc.  The 
fact that a market for loans to similar debtors exists does not justify its 
use as cramdown proxy, particularly in light of the fact that a plurality 
of the Supreme Court patently rejected the contention that lenders 
should be allowed to reap the same profit they could have obtained by 
investing in leveraged loans to entities similar to the debtor.  It follows 
that the two-step approach endorsed by American HomePatient will 
rarely yield a result consistent with the ECMH and the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning. 
For the reasons discussed above, the formula approach as articu-
lated in Till and Momentive should be the standard method for deter-
mining cramdown rates in chapter 11.  Such an approach is most con-
sistent with Till’s fundamental principal, footnote 14, the policy 
behind the Bankruptcy Code, and modern financial theory. 
 
 
